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INTRODUCTION
Although we have been living in the Internet age for more than a decade now, its implications for copyright law and the fair use doctrine have
only just begun to manifest.1 By expanding the breadth, diversity and sheer
*

Assistant Professor, DePaul University College of Law. This Article benefited enormously from
Justin Hughes‘ extensive and insightful comments and from the diligent editorial assistance of David
Pekarek Krohn and Gautam Huded. Thanks also to David Fagundes, Brett Frischmann, Elizabeth
Townsend Gard, Andrew Gold, Eric Goldman, Bobbi Kwall, Tonja Jacobi, Adam Mossoff, Dotan Oliar,
Miquel Peguera Poch, Glen Robinson, Mark Schultz, Christopher Sprigman, Rebecca Tushnet and to the
faculties of DePaul University College of Law and the University of Virginia School of Law. An earlier
version of this article was presented at the American Intellectual Property Law Association Annual
Meeting 2007, the Intellectual Property Scholars Conference 2008, the University of Virginia School of
Law Faculty Workshop and the DePaul University College of Law Faculty Workshop. Special thanks to
the University of Virginia School of Law Library staff and to Adam Cieslak for their invaluable research
assistance. Please address comments to msag@depaul.edu.
1
I use the term Internet age here to refer to the period from 1994 to the present—the period in
which the Internet was popularized and commercialized. Technically, the first packet-switching node of
what would later be called the ARPANET went live on October 29, 1969. See HILARY W. POOLE ET
AL., THE INTERNET: A HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 206 (2005). The first TCP/IP-wide area network
was operational by January 1, 1983, when the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) constructed a
university network backbone that later became the NSFNet. Id. at 145–46.
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number of copyrighted works in existence, the Internet has fundamentally
changed the nature of copyright markets. This transformation is most significant in the context of what I term ―copy-reliant technologies‖—
technologies that copy expressive works for nonexpressive ends. Copyreliant technologies, such as Internet search engines and plagiarism detection software, do not read, understand, or enjoy copyrighted works, nor do
they deliver these works directly to the public. They do, however, necessarily copy them in order to process them as grist for the mill, raw materials
that feed various algorithms and indices.
Other scholars have considered separately the copyright implications
of Internet search engines, plagiarism detection software, reverse engineering of software, and the recently settled Google Book Project controversy.2
This Article attempts to provide a unifying theoretical framework for these
issues, recognizing them as subparts of a broader phenomenon: the emergence of copy-reliant technology.
Copy-reliant technologies tend to interact with copyrighted works by
copying them routinely, automatically, and indiscriminately. These technologies are vital to the operation of the Internet, but they are vulnerable to
claims of copyright infringement at key stages of their operation. Copyreliant technologies typically display three significant traits: (1) the copying
of expressive works for nonexpressive uses, (2) a high volume of transactions, and (3) the use of technologically enabled opt-out mechanisms to reduce transaction costs. The business models that employ these technologies
often inherently require these traits.
The rise of copy-reliant technologies exposes seemingly novel questions. First, should a nonexpressive use, which nonetheless requires copying the entirety of a copyrighted work, be found to infringe the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner? Our historical intuition is that works are copied to communicate at least some part of the work‘s original expression:
books are copied to be read, not to serve as paperweights; and compact
discs are copied to be played, not to function as drink coasters. This Article
concludes that because expressive communication to the public implicitly
defines and limits the extent of the copyright owner‘s exclusive rights, acts
2

On search engines, see Urs Gasser, Regulating Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead,
8 YALE J. L. & TECH. 201 (2006); James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA
L. REV. 1 (2007). On reverse engineering, see Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and
Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002). On plagiarism, see Samuel J. Horovitz,
Two Wrongs Don‘t Negate A Copyright: Don‘t Make Students Turnitin If You Won‘t Give It Back,
60 FLA. L. REV. 229 (2008). On Google Book, see, for example, Oren Bracha, Standing Copyright Law
on Its Head? The Googlization of Everything and the Many Faces of Property, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1799
(2007); Emily Anne Proskine, Google‘s Technicolor Dreamcoat: A Copyright Analysis of the Google
Book Search Library Project, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213 (2006); Rebecca Tushnet, My Library: Copyright and the Role of Institutions in a Peer-to-Peer World, 53 UCLA L. REV. 977 (2006); Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Googlization of Everything and the Future of Copyright, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1207
(2007).
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of copying that do not communicate the author‘s original expression to the
public do not generally constitute copyright infringement.
The second important question raised by copy-reliant technologies relates to the opt-out mechanisms built into many copy-reliant technologies.
The architects of these technologies have chosen to build in these mechanisms to preserve the autonomy of the copyright owner. These mechanisms,
however, switch the default position from ―no copying without permission‖
to one in which copyright owners must affirmatively opt out of specific
uses of their works. Accordingly, we face the question of whether this
modification of the usual copyright default is justified from either a doctrinal or a utilitarian perspective.
The challenge presented by copy-reliant technology inevitably interacts
with the issue of fair use. Technically, the fair use doctrine renders certain
otherwise infringing actions relating to copyrighted works noninfringing.3
More generally, fair use allows the use of copyrighted works without permission; as such, it performs a vital function in the modern copyright system by establishing limits on the otherwise expansive rights of copyright
owners.4 Because of the fair use doctrine‘s pivotal role in adapting copyright law to new technology, any examination of copyright and new technology inevitably becomes a reflection on the nature of fair use. This
Article explains the correct application of the fair use doctrine in the context
of nonexpressive uses. Furthermore, this Article explores the application of
fair use in situations where the alleged infringer has provided copyright
owners with the ability to opt out.
Part I of this Article introduces the phenomenon of copy-reliant technology by focusing on four significant case studies. The first case study,
Field v. Google Inc., centers on the permissibility of automated archiving in
the context of text-based search engines.5 The second case study, Perfect
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., centers on the creation and display of thumbnail representations of copyrighted photographs by image-based search engines.6 The conduct challenged in the third case study, the Google Book
Project, relates both to the generation of metadata and to the display of
fragments of books as part of a menu of search results.7 The final case
study looks at plagiarism detection software, which also addresses the use

3
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (―[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.‖).
4
As I have argued elsewhere, this function actually allows copyright owners a broader set of exclusive rights than would otherwise be possible. Matthew Sag, God in the Machine, A New Structural
Analysis of Copyright‘s Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 381 (2005).
5
412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006); see infra Part I.B.1.
6
487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007); see infra Part I.B.2.
7
Class Action Complaint, Authors Guild v. Google, No. 05-CV-8136 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2005);
see infra Part I.B.3.

1609

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

of copyrighted works to generate metadata.8 These case studies illustrate
copy-reliant technology in a number of contexts that are further developed
in Parts II and III.
Part II explores the doctrinal implications of the nonexpressive use of
copyrighted works. Traditionally, copyright owners have been able to control significant communicative or expressive uses of their works—such as
reproduction, display and performance. In contrast, copy-reliant technologies typically use copyrighted works in a way that is noncommunicative
and nonexpressive. A careful review of existing copyright doctrine suggests that the rights of copyright owners do not typically encompass nonexpressive uses of their works. I argue that recognizing a principle of
nonexpressive use resolves many questions relating to copy-reliant technologies. It also reconciles many puzzling features of the fair use doctrine
more broadly. Part II concludes by addressing the doctrinal incorporation
of this principle of nonexpressive use through the application of the fair use
doctrine.
Part III studies the doctrinal implications of high transaction costs in
relation to copy-reliant technologies and the use of opt-out mechanisms to
mitigate those transaction costs. It then analyzes the relationship between
transaction costs and the form and content of property rights generally, and
the relevance of opt-outs to a fair use analysis.
I. COPY-RELIANT TECHNOLOGIES AND THE INTERNET
This Part begins, in section A, with a general discussion of the link between the technological and social changes of the Internet era and the evolution of copyright law. It also explains the centrality of the fair use
doctrine in recalibrating copyright law as technology and market conditions
change. This framework forms the essential theoretical background for understanding the significance of the copy-reliant technology. Section B describes four case studies of copy-reliant technology that serve to illustrate
the concept and its application. These case studies are the empirical backbone of this Article; they are introduced in this Part and further developed
in Parts II and III. As the case studies illustrate, copy-reliant technologies
tend to raise certain recurring legal issues: the copying of expressive works
for nonexpressive uses, the potential for high transaction costs, and the role
of opt-out mechanisms in addressing these transaction cost problems.9

8

A.V. v. iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008); see infra Part I.B.4. Space constraints
preclude additional case studies covering areas such as software reverse engineering.
9
See infra Parts II and III for the further development of these issues.
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A. New Technologies, Copyright Markets, and Copyright Law
From the printing press to the photocopier, from the piano-roll to the
mp3 player, new technologies have fundamentally altered copyright law.10
Photography, motion pictures, sound recording, and broadcasting have each
demanded and (eventually) received accommodation from copyright law.11
As the technologies of reproduction and communication change, they create
new vehicles of creative expression, new communities of interest, and expose latent ambiguities within existing doctrines.12
In some respects, the new technologies of copying and distribution that
form the Internet represent a continuation of this trend. Napster‘s peer-topeer file sharing technology (or more recently, BitTorrent) exemplifies how
digital technology and online distribution allow users to copy and distribute
existing works, such as sound recording and motion pictures, at virtually no
cost.13 Unlocking content from physical delivery has facilitated more than
just piracy; it has also enabled legal digital music services that have made
more music available at a lower cost than ever before.14
Advances in technology have also opened up new possibilities of creative production by reducing the cost of sound and video editing. The type
of video editing software used to create the Phantom Edit15—a fan edited
version of Star Wars Episode I without the much-reviled Jar Jar Binks character—used to be reserved for Hollywood studios alone; it is now widely
available for less than the cost of a new television.16 These new possibilities
have done more than simply lower costs for existing producers; they have
introduced new participants and in some cases dramatically changed the

10

See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT‘S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX (2003) (tracing the development of copyright law in the United States); JESSICA LITMAN,
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001) (tracing the history of copyright legislation in the United States); Peter Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law‘s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63 (2002) (arguing that the
digital revolution represents a third distinct wave of technological innovation that portends significant
changes in copyright protection).
11
See generally LITMAN, supra note 10 (discussing the legislative history of U.S. copyright law in
the twentieth century).
12
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, 22–23 (1999); WILLIAM
LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003).
13
See generally Matthew Helton, Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement: BitTorrent as a
Vehicle for Establishing a New Copyright Definition for Staple Articles of Commerce, 40 COLUM. J. L.
& SOC. PROBS. 1 (2006) (explaining the technological and legal implications of the nearly costless replication of copyrighted data).
14
See CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL 139 (2006) (noting the effect on price).
15
See Amy Harmon, ‗Star Wars‘ Fan Films Come Tumbling Back to Earth, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28,
2002, § 2 (Arts & Leisure), at 28 (discussing STAR WARS EPISODE 1.1: THE PHANTOM EDIT (2001), and
its creation).
16
See Wikipedia, List of Video Editing Software, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_video
_editing _software (last visited July 27, 2009), for a list of video editing software, including several free
and open source modules.
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medium. The disruptive effect of political blogs on the agenda-setting
power of newspapers and television reporting is just one example.17
To regard these changes, and their implications for copyright law, as a
mere continuation of past technological changes would risk overlooking a
crucial transformation.18 Digital technology and the Internet have significantly expanded the scope, diversity, and number of copyrighted works in
existence. The cost of reproducing and disseminating digital works has not
merely fallen; in many cases it has become entirely negligible. Thus, the
Internet has not merely induced an increase in copying, but an exponential
increase. This is not just a difference in degree, but a difference in kind.19
Similarly, copyright policy in the Internet age requires more than the inclusion of one or two neglected interest groups; copyright law now reaches
deep inside the home and must take account of a much broader set of stakeholders than ever before.20 The proliferation of copyrighted works in the Internet age is not simply a question of scale; the Internet has radically
decentralized the production of information and expressive works, such that
the producers of publicly available copyrighted works are now more numerous and more diverse than at any time in human history.
The magnitude of these changes does not automatically suggest that
copyright has no application online, or that we should discard the substantial body of copyright law that has developed over the past two centuries.
To the contrary, many of the principles and distinctions derived from preInternet cases are equally applicable online. Often, the mere fact that copying took place online is of little or no relevance. For example, the legality
of the 655,000 self-described parody videos hosted on YouTube21 largely
depends on the amount of copyrighted material taken by the parodist,22 and
on whether courts reasonably perceive the work as a genuine parody of the

17

See Kevin Wallsten, Agenda Setting and the Blogosphere: An Analysis of the Relationship Between Mainstream Media and Political Blogs, 24 REV. POL‘Y RES. 567, 567–87 (2007) (finding a complex, bidirectional relationship between mainstream media coverage and blog discussion rather than a
unidirectional media or blog agenda-setting effect); see also Stephen A. Banning & Kaye D. Sweetser,
How Much Do They Think It Affects Them and Whom Do They Believe?: Comparing the Third-Person
Effect and Credibility of Blogs and Traditional Media, 55 COMM. Q. 451, 451–66 (2007) (finding no
observable differences between the credibility of blogs and that of more traditional media).
18
See Menell, supra note 10, at 64 (discussing the relationship between new technology and new
modes of expression).
19
P.W. Anderson, More Is Different: Broken Symmetry and the Nature of the Hierarchical Structure of Science, 177 (4047) SCIENCE 393 (1972).
20
See LITMAN, supra note 10.
21
This figure is based on a YouTube.com search for the term parody, http://www.youtube.com/
results?search_type=&search_query=parody&aq=f (search performed July 1, 2009).
22
Berlin v. E.C. Publ‘ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964).
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copyright owner‘s work.23 These considerations are the same today as they
were in 1994, when the Supreme Court last addressed the issue.24
However, this apparent continuity should not blind us to significant
underlying changes. The advent of discussion boards, blogs, social networking sites, photo-sharing sites, and other user-generated content has
made the fair use doctrine more important to more people than ever before.
The fair use doctrine has become increasingly significant to the general
public because digital technology and the Internet have enabled new forums
and new ways to interact with copyrighted material, often by copying portions of it.25 For example, while cutting out an article from a newspaper and
sending it to a friend through the U.S. postal service does not implicate
copyright, posting the contents of the same article on an Internet discussion
board or blog necessitates copying and thus raises the specter of copyright
infringement. The fair use doctrine has also become more important to the
public as the sharing of user-generated content online enables copyright
owners to detect infringement more easily.26 The scope of fair use in relation to YouTube videos, blogs, and other forms of user-generated content is
an important issue, but outside the scope of this Article. Instead, this Article explores a different set of issues that augurs a more fundamental
change in the way we think about copyright and fair use. Indeed, this Article seeks to refocus the copyright debate, shifting it away from the perennial concern about freedom of expression and onto the important topic of
nonexpressive use.27 Specifically, this Article addresses the operation of
copyright law in relation to copy-reliant technologies, such as Internet
search engines, electronic archives, plagiarism detection software, and other
applications that rely on copying expressive works for nonexpressive ends.
These technological changes are significant for copyright because by
enabling more people to produce a greater range of copyrighted material,
the Internet has fundamentally changed the nature of copyright markets. To
appreciate the significance of these changes for copyright law, it is first necessary to examine the economic function of copyright.
Copyright creates exclusive rights in certain forms of expression to
give authors an incentive to create those works in the first place.28 However, these same exclusive rights raise the cost for consumers to acquire those
works, and for subsequent authors to create further expressive works. In
23
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994); see also SunTrust Bank v. Houghton
Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109
F.3d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1997).
24
Campbell, 510 U.S. 569.
25
See L.A. Times v. Free Republic, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2000).
26
See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535,
1537–39 (2005).
27
See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein,
54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 42 (2001).
28
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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the world of tangible objects, these costs become price signals that ensure
the efficient allocation of goods to those who value them most. Given,
however, that expressive works can be consumed again and again by different people without diminishing their value, the exclusive rights established
by copyright also result in some deadweight loss because those who are
unwilling to pay the higher price are forced to go without the work in question.29
The author‘s exclusive rights under copyright law provide a buffer
against price competition. This buffer to competition allows the author to
charge higher prices than she otherwise could, which in turn has two immediate effects. First, some consumers remain willing to purchase the work at
a higher price and consequently pay more. Assuming we value the welfare
of both consumers and authors equally, this is simply a wealth transfer and
is welfare neutral. Second, it forces those who are unwilling to pay the
higher price to go without the work in question.30 Market allocation of
scarce resources to their highest valued use is usually welfare enhancing,
but for nonrivalrous goods, the exclusion of low-value users produces a
deadweight loss because their consumption is not at the expense of another
who values the good more.31
That copyright requires a balance between ―the interests of authors and
inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on
the one hand, and society‘s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand‖ has long been understood.32
What is sometimes less clearly grasped is that where this balance should be
struck depends not just on the relative needs of authors and consumers, but
also on how effectively we expect those parties to cooperate and compromise.33 In many situations, authors can license their creations with relative
ease and the theoretical loss of exclusion is minimal.34 In other situations,
however, copyright markets do not function so smoothly. Sometimes copyright owners ―wield their economic control with the deftness of a surgeon‘s
scalpel,‖35 while other times it is more like a cudgel. For example, Stephen
Joyce has been accused of attempting to control access to unpublished ma29

For a more detailed discussion of the economics of copyright, see Matthew Sag, Beyond Abstraction: The Law and Economics of Copyright Scope and Doctrinal Efficiency, 81 TUL. L. REV. 187 (2006).
30
This assumes, realistically, the absence of perfect price discrimination. See generally Kathleen
Carroll & Dennis Coates, Teaching Price Discrimination: Some Clarification, 66 S. ECON. J. 466, 471–
78 (1999) (noting that the assumption that price discrimination is efficient is often implausible).
31
See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11–23 (2004) (describing the effect of exclusion on resource allocation).
32
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
33
See Sag, supra note 29, at 208–15 (discussing the relationship between copyright scope and the
effectiveness of private ordering).
34
See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 5 (discussing product differentiation through versioning in the
book publishing and motion picture industries).
35
Id.
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terial in order to influence historical and literary conceptions of his grandfather, James Joyce, whose literary estate he controls.36 The Joyce estate‘s
threats of copyright litigation forced one Joyce biographer to file for a declaratory judgment that her academic book and proposed electronic supplement did not infringe copyright.37 Biographers of Howard Hughes have
faced similar difficulties.38
Copyright law addresses potential market malfunctions in a number of
ways. Doctrines such as the idea–expression distinction protect the expressive elements of the author‘s work while guaranteeing subsequent authors
the necessary breathing space to make their own contributions by adding to,
reusing, or reinterpreting the facts and ideas embodied in the original
work.39 Statutory exemptions and compulsory licenses—such as the special
reproduction rights of libraries and archives,40 and the compulsory license
for making and distributing audio recordings41—also provide some breathing space. Their scope, however, tends to be limited. The primary way in
which copyright law adjusts to potential market malfunctions is through the
evolution of the mercurial doctrine of fair use.
Fair use is a flexible standard that limits the scope of copyright protection and renders certain actions relating to copyrighted works noninfringing.42 Activities that courts have regarded as fair use that may have
otherwise been infringing include: quoting a significant portion of a work
for the purpose of criticism, illustration, comment, or clarification; parodying a work; and copying part of a work in the course of classroom activities.43 Judges and legal scholars frequently attest to the importance of the
fair use doctrine,44 but in spite of its partial codification in the Copyright
Act of 1976, the exact nature of fair use remains elusive and resists
straightforward definition.45
36

See Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2007); R. Anthony Reese, Public but
Private: Copyright‘s New Unpublished Public Domain, 85 TEX. L. REV. 585, 618 (2007); see also D.T.
Max, The Injustice Collector, NEW YORKER, June 19, 2006, at 34–43 (providing an account of Stephen
Joyce‘s various threats of copyright litigation).
37
Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1083.
38
Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
39
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); see also Warner
Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) (describing the idea–expression distinction as ―an effort to enable courts to adjust the tension between these competing effects of copyright
protection‖).
40
17 U.S.C. § 108(a) (2006).
41
17 U.S.C. § 115.
42
17 U.S.C. § 107.
43
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (1961).
44
See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Publ‘ns. Int‘l., Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 518 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (noting
that fair use doctrine plays an essential role in copyright law).
45
See Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (describing fair use as one
of the most troublesome doctrines in the entire law of copyright).
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Fair use allows the use of copyrighted works without permission. As
such, it performs a vital function in the modern copyright system by establishing limits on the otherwise expansive rights of copyright owners. Fair
use is necessary, in part, because licensing and other private ordering mechanisms do not provide a solution for cases involving high transaction
costs, strategic holdouts, and inadvertent copying.46 The fair use doctrine is
particularly important in situations where the costs of obtaining permission
outweigh the benefits of the use. The doctrine also plays a mediating role
in situations where the copyright owner withholds permission for reasons
that society finds unacceptable. For example, a copyright owner usually
cannot deny permission to copy in order to stifle parody, criticism, or social
debate.47
B. Four Case Studies of Copy-Reliant Technology
Much of the discussion that follows concentrates on various forms of
search technology as a compelling illustration of the issues that apply to
copy-reliant technologies more generally: the copying of expressive works
for nonexpressive uses, the potential for high transaction costs, and the role
of opt-out mechanisms in addressing these transaction costs problems.
Search technology is clearly a significant public policy issue.48 The Internet has become integral to modern existence. For many, it is the dominant medium of communication, research, entertainment, social interaction,
and political participation.49 Search technology drives the Internet.50 Without reliable search technology, the world‘s 1.7 billion Internet users51 would
have very little hope of finding what they were looking for among the hundreds of billions of individual web pages comprising the World Wide
Web.52 Search engines allow users to sift through massive amounts of data
to find the specific information that is of particular interest to them. The In46
See Sag, supra note 29, at 250 (criticizing doctrinal recommendations which aim to optimize
copyright scope in the abstract but do not account for the uncertain effects or strategic behavior); see
also Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483 (2007) (discussing the necessity of fair use).
47
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); see also SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
48
Lucas Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web: Why the Politics of Search Engines Matters, 16 INFO. SOC‘Y 169 (2000).
49
See Press Release, Pew Res. Ctr., Social Networking and Online Videos Take Off, Internet‘s
Broader Role in Campaign 2008 (Jan. 11, 2008), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/384.pdf
(summarizing survey data).
50
Following common usage, references herein to the Internet encompass both the physical layer
and the content layer. See Robert E. Kahn & Vinton G. Cerf, What Is the Internet (And What Makes It
Work), CORP. FOR NAT‘L RES. INITIATIVES (Dec. 1999), available at http://www.cnri.reston.va.us/
what_is_internet.html.
51
Internet World Stats, World Internet Usage and Population Statistics, http://www.Internetworld
stats.com/stats.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
52
See infra note 275 and accompanying text.
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ternet would function very differently and much less efficiently without
search engines.53 Indeed, users might not find a great deal of content on the
Internet without search engines, which begs the question of whether anyone
would have the incentive to create or post content in the first place.54
Internet search engines typify copy-reliant technology in that they require the routine and indiscriminate copying of expressive works for nonexpressive purposes. Search engines copy expressive works in order to
apply certain mathematical functions to their contents, they do not comprehend or enjoy copyrighted works in the way that humans do—they simply
process them as raw materials that feed various algorithms and indices. Automated software agents of the search engines continuously ―crawl‖ across
the Internet copying web pages. These copies form the raw data underpinning these search engines, which is later analyzed and cataloged.55 As part
of this process, search engines both copy and index each web page they
find. They then store the HTML code from those pages in a temporary repository called a cache.56
Search engines direct users to particular websites based on the relationship of their search term to the index of pages maintained by the search engine provider.57 Typically, search engines display search results in a list
that features both the title of the relevant web page and a short ―snippet‖ or
extract from the targeted web page. In the popular Google search engine,
two hyperlinks follow the snippet. One goes to the actual web page, and
the other goes to the cached version of the page stored on the provider‘s
servers. Thus, search engines must copy web pages to generate the data
that allows them to process search requests. They also must copy web pages in order to display fragments of them as search results. The centrality of
copying to these routine functions leaves search engines vulnerable to

53

Web directories which list websites by category and subcategory offer an alternative to search
engines. However, general directories require an elaborate system of categorization that tends to ossify
and become redundant as the context for information retrieval and the relevance of existing information
changes.
54
Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 48; see generally JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: HOW
GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE (2005)
(providing an account of the history and significance of Internet search).
55
It is important for the discussion that follows to note that caching (i.e., copying web pages) is distinct from, and precedes, indexing. See Sergey Brin & Lawrence Page, The Anatomy of a Large-Scale
Hypertextual Web Search Engine, 30 COMPUTER NETWORKS AND ISDN SYSTEMS 107 (1998), available
at http://infolab.stanford.edu/~backrub/google.html.
56
The three most popular search engines are currently Google, Yahoo!, and MSN. Each of these
displays ―cached‖ links with their search results. See Enid Burns, U.S. Search Engine Rankings, December 2007, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH, Feb. 5, 2008, http://searchenginewatch.com/showPage
.html?page=3628341 (estimating Google‘s market share at 58.4 percent, Yahoo!‘s at 22.9 percent, and
Microsoft‘s at 9.8 percent) (last visited Aug. 12, 2009).
57
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,285,999 (filed Jan. 9, 1998) (―Method for Node Ranking in a Linked
Database.‖).
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claims of copyright infringement. Whether these claims are spurious or
well founded is the central topic of this Article.
The four case studies that follow provide a brief illustration of the vulnerability of copy-reliant technologies and their associated business models
to claims of copyright infringement. The sections that follow briefly describe these cases. The remainder of this Article then explores them in
more detail.
1. Archiving Copyrighted Works: Field v. Google Inc.—In 2006, Blake Field, a Las Vegas personal injury attorney, sued the Internet search
giant Google for copyright infringement.58 The basis of Field‘s claim was
that Google had infringed his rights by allowing Internet users to access
copies of his copyrighted works stored by Google‘s search engine cache.59
Search engines allow users to retrieve items from the cache for two
main reasons. First, cached links enable Internet users to detect changes
that have been made to a particular web page.60 The differences such comparisons reveal can have important political, educational, and legal ramifications.61 Second, the availability of cached links enables users to
understand why the search engine returned a seemingly irrelevant web page
in response to their query. Although these functions relate to the copyrighted expression contained in the original website, they do not replicate
the expressive function of the original. By definition, the use of a cached
version of a web page to detect changes is a use that the original copyrighted work could not serve alone.62 Likewise, referring to the cache to
understand better the relationship between a particular page and a particular
search term is also a use that the original copyrighted work could not serve
alone.63

58

See Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
Id. at 1115.
60
Id. at 1112 (noting that by examining Google‘s copy of the page, people can identify subtle but
potentially significant differences between the current and cached versions of a page).
61
See generally Matthew Fagan, ―Can You Do a Wayback on That?‖ The Legal Community‘s Use
of Cached Web Pages In and Out of Trial, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 46 (2007) (exploring the implications of web caching for the legal community); see also infra note 63.
62
Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1119.
63
The Internet Archive is also subject to a similar set of copyright issues. The Internet Archive,
http://archive.org, has amassed a collection of over 85 billion screenshots of web pages which are stored
on a computer database in California. These web pages are available at no cost to the public via the
―Wayback Machine.‖ Similar to an Internet search engine, the Internet Archive uses a web crawler to
routinely take snapshots of websites as they exist on various days. The Wayback Machine does not direct a user to a live website; instead, it presents the user with a static archived version of the website retrieved from the Internet Archive‘s database. The Wayback Machine is an invaluable tool for
researchers, historians, and, increasingly, litigators, because it provides a record of the contents of a
website that is independent of the website‘s author. See, e.g., Healthcare Advocates, Inc. v. Harding,
Earley, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627, 629 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that viewing and printing
archived web pages retrieved from the Wayback Machine was fair use).
59

1618

103:1607 (2009)

Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology

Although not expressed in this terminology, the essence of the trial
court‘s finding in Field was that the nonexpressive use of the works in the
cache did not interfere with the rights accorded to Field as an author.64
Field‘s apparent ability to opt out of inclusion in the Google search engine
also impacted the court‘s decision.65 The significance of both of these rationales will be addressed below.66
2. Displaying Search Results: Perfect 10 v. Amazon.—Google‘s search engine technology was also at the core of another recent case, Perfect
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.67 Perfect 10 produces and sells copyrighted
images of nude models.68 It does so primarily through a subscription website.69 The material on Perfect 10‘s own website is neither indexed nor
cached by the Google search engine; however, the search engine has no
mechanism to exclude images republished by third parties without Perfect
10‘s authorization.70
To comprehend Perfect 10‘s objection to Google‘s image search engine, it is first necessary to understand how image-based search technology
differs from conventional text-based search technology. Instead of recognizing images themselves, image search software identifies text associated
with objects identified as images. If the text associated with an image file is
responsive to a user‘s search query, the search engine will display a small
lower resolution ―thumbnail‖ of the image in the search results. If an Internet user selects that thumbnail, the browser takes the user to the original location to retrieve the full-scale image.71 One of Perfect 10‘s several theories
of liability was that by producing these thumbnail representations, Google
was improperly copying Perfect 10‘s work without its authorization.72 The
district court agreed with Perfect 10 on this theory of infringement. However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the use of thumbnail representations in an image-based search engine did not constitute
copyright infringement.73 The essence of the court‘s reasoning—that
Google‘s use of thumbnails ―served a different function‖ unrelated to ―artistic expression‖—is consistent with the nonexpressive use paradigm advanced in this Article.74
64

412 F. Supp. 2d at 1119.
Id.
66
See infra Parts II and III.
67
487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).
68
Id. at 710.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 711.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 721 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,
336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that thumbnails are transformative).
65
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3. Generating Metadata: The Google Book Project.—Google‘s selfappointed mission ―to organize the world‘s information and make it universally accessible and useful‖ is not limited to that which is already in digital
form.75 Likened to the Library of Alexandria,76 the Google Book Search Library Project (Google Book) aims to make the contents of over nine million
books—the entire catalog of some of the world‘s most prestigious and extensive libraries—searchable by anyone with an Internet connection.77 To
create this search index, Google is currently in the process of digitizing vast
collections of books, one page at a time.
Google Book allows users to search inside the text of captured books
and to generate a list of books relevant to the user‘s search terms. 78 Google
does not allow users to access the entire contents of any book, nor even an
entire page of any book, unless the book is known to be in the public domain or the copyright owner has expressly agreed to such access.79 In the
default scenario—where Google has not received permission and the book
does not appear to be in the public domain—Google Book presents a user
who clicks on a book title with bibliographic data about the target book and
a small extract or ―snippet‖ of the relevant page containing her search
terms.80 It also presents users with additional information about the books
targeted by their search term, including links to online bookstores and links
to nearby libraries where the user can obtain the book.81

75

Google Corporate Information: Company Overview, http://www.google.com/corporate (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
76
Brewster Kahle, Speech to the Library of Congress in the Digital Future Series (Dec. 13, 2004),
available at http://www.archive.org/details/cspan_brewster_kahle.
77
Bob Thompson, Search Me?; Google Wants to Digitize Every Book. Publishers Say Read the
Fine Print First, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2006, at D1.
78
Answer, Jury Demand, and affirmative defenses of defendant Google Inc. ¶ 19, Authors Guild v.
Google Inc., No. 05-CV-8136 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2005); Answer, Jury Demand, and affirmative defenses of defendant Google Inc. ¶ 4, McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc. v. Google Inc. No. 05-CV-8881 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 8, 2005). Unless otherwise stated, discussion of the Google Book project in this Article does not
take into account the substantial changes envisaged under the revised class action settlement. At the
time this Article went to press, the settlement had yet to be finally approved by the district court. The
proposed settlement is available at http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/.
79
Answer, Jury Demand, and affirmative defenses of defendant Google Inc. ¶ 4, McGraw-Hill Cos.,
Inc. v. Google Inc. No. 05-CV-8881 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2005). Google has several agreements with publishers to do just that. See Complaint ¶ 30, 31, McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc. v. Google Inc. No. 05-CV-8881
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2005); Answer, Jury Demand, and affirmative defenses of defendant Google Inc.
¶ 30, McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc. v. Google Inc. No. 05-CV-8881 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2005). Amazon.com‘s
Search Inside feature also offers similar functionality for the much smaller collection of works for which
Amazon.com has been able to obtain permission from the relevant publishers. See Amazon.com‘s Responses And Objections To Subpoena Served By Google Inc., McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc. v. Google Inc. and
Authors Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05-CV-8136 and No. 05-CV–8881 (W.D.Wash. Oct. 20, 2006).
80
Google, What You‘ll See When You Search on Google Book Search, http://books.google.com/
googlebooks/screenshots.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
81
Id.
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Google Book‘s potential benefits to researchers are easily demonstrated. It takes just three clicks to go from the initial Google Book search
screen to the call number of a specific and useful book in the University of
Virginia Law library. For example, one might search for a basic statistical
textbook discussing the limits of accepting the null hypothesis by entering
the search term ―accepting the null hypothesis.‖82 Entering the search term
generates a menu of books containing the term. Selecting any one book
leads to a fuller set of information about the book, including snippets from
the digitized book illustrating the relevance of the search term to the contents of the book, bibliographic information, links to reviews, links to references from web pages, links to references from other books, and details of
other editions.
Figure 1: Example of a Google Book ―Snippet‖

The same screen also contains a menu of location options allowing the
user to buy the book from online retailers, such as Amazon.com and Barnes
& Noble, or to find the book in a lending library. A second click generates
a list of libraries ranked in order of geographic proximity. A third click actually retrieves the call number from, for instance, the University of Virginia Law Library.83 In this fashion, Google Book allows users to sort vast
volumes of information according to relevance and accessibility. Google
Book will also provide information about books that are out of print or otherwise inaccessible to most of the public.84 It might be hyperbolic to suggest that ―all the books in the world [will] become a single liquid fabric of
interconnected words and ideas,‖85 but perhaps great advances in human
knowledge deserve a little hyperbole.
Not everyone is so enamored. Google has recently settled two significant lawsuits in relation to Google Book.86 The first is by the American As-

82

Search conducted by the author on April 7, 2009 using the Google Book search engine at
http://books.google.com.
83
The book located in this example was Science and Behavior: An Introduction to Methods of Research, which contains a useful discussion of the problem of accepting the null hypothesis at page 149.
JOHN M. NEALE & ROBERT M. LIEBERT, SCIENCE AND BEHAVIOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO METHODS OF
RESEARCH 149 (2d ed. 1980).
84
See Edward Wyatt, Google Adds Library Texts to Search Database, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2005, at
C11.
85
Kevin Kelly, Scan This Book!, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2006, §6 (Magazine), at 42.
86
See supra note 78.
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sociation of University Presses.87 The second is a class action representing
published authors and The Authors Guild.88 Both suits sought declaratory
and injunctive relief and money damages. The copyright challenge to
Google Book focused primarily on the way Google is building its search
engine, rather than the output of the search engine per se.89 The information
contained in the search results of any one Google Book search is not, by itself, likely to infringe the copyright of any author for two reasons. First,
most of the information Google Book generates falls into the category of
facts about books, which are not protectable by copyright.90 Second, even
the snippets of material that Google directly copies from the print version of
a book will not amount to copyright infringement because the amounts taken are too fragmented and insignificant to constitute a substantial reproduction of the original work.91
However, the manner in which Google is building its formidable database presents more serious copyright issues. In the same way that Internet
search engines routinely, automatically, and indiscriminately copy web
pages as part of the indexing process, the Google Book project requires the
routine, automatic, and indiscriminate copying of printed library books
whether they are likely to be protected by copyright or not. Like the other
search engine case studies above, Google does not copy these literary works
to disseminate a substantive amount of their expressive content to the public, but rather as grist for the search engine mill. Google Book is consistent
with the first two case studies in another important way: just like with its
other search engines, Google has provided a method by which authors who
do not want to have their works included in Google Book have the ability to
opt out.92 The implications of both of these features are discussed in more
detail in Parts II and III.

87
The Association of American University Publishers on behalf of the McGraw-Hill Companies,
Pearson Education, Penguin Group (USA), Simon & Schuster, and John Wiley & Sons, also filed suit
against Google on October 19, 2005. See McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc. v. Google Inc., Civil Action No. 05CV-8881 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2005).
88
The Authors Guild filed a lawsuit in relation to Google‘s scanning and digitizing of library books
on September 20, 2005. See Class Action Complaint, Authors Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05-CV-8136
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2005).
89
Admittedly, the Authors Guild‘s Class Action Compliant is not so precise. See First Amended
Class Action Compliant ¶¶ 3–4, Authors Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05-CV-8136 (S.D.N.Y. July 24,
2006).
90
See infra Part II.B.
91
See infra Part II.B. This may not be so with respect to poetry, dictionaries, drug reference guides,
price guides, and books of quotations. Google intends to provide snippet previews of such works only
with authorization from the rightsholder. See Google, Google Book Settlement, http://www.googlebook
settlement.com/help/bin/answer.py?answer=118722 (last visited Aug. 4, 2009).
92
The mechanics of the opt-out mechanism have been considerably refined in the proposed Google
Book Settlement. See Matthew Sag, The Google Book Settlement and the Fair Use Counterfactual (July
22, 2009) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1437812.
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4. Turnitin.com: Plagiarism Detection Software.—Several different
types of educational institutions have turned to technological solutions to
combat the threat of plagiarism.93 Harvard University,94 the International
Baccalaureate program,95 and thousands of high schools across the United
States96 use plagiarism detection software to detect and deter cheating by
their students. Plagiarism detection services, such as those available at
Turnitin.com, detect improper and unaccredited copying in student papers
by comparing new papers to an archive of material available on the Internet
and to proprietary databases of previously submitted papers.97
This technology has obvious benefits for educators and for students.
However, like other copy-reliant technologies, antiplagiarism software also
has its share of critics.98 In 2006, students at McLean High School in Virginia objected when the school mandated the compulsory use of antiplagiarism software.99 The students took umbrage to both the implied accusation
of cheating and to the fact that a commercial software company would be
able to make use of their works by adding them to a reference database.100
Two McLean High School students followed up their protest with a copyright infringement lawsuit against iParadigms, the company that provides
the Turnitin.com service.101 The students sought a total of $900,000 in
damages based on alleged copyright infringement of six term papers. At
least one of the papers contained an express instruction that it was not to be
archived.102 Some other plagiarism detection services avoid similar disputes
by allowing students to opt out of inclusion in their reference databases.
93
Darby Dickerson, Facilitated Plagiarism: The Saga of Term-Paper Mills and the Failure of Legislation and Litigation to Control Them, 52 VILL. L. REV. 21, 21 (2007) (citing various studies of academic integrity, including a 1999 survey finding 50 percent of students admitted to Internet plagiarism).
94
See Nation In Brief, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2006, at A15.
95
See S. Mitra Kalita, Schools Turn to Software to Help Stop Plagiarism, WASH. POST, Apr. 15,
2004, at T4.
96
See Andy Dehnart, The Web‘s Plagiarism Police, SALON.COM, June 14, 1999,
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/1999/06/14/plagiarism (reviewing several different services); Maria
Glod, McLean Students Sue Anti-Cheating Service; Plaintiffs Say Company‘s Database of Term Papers,
Essays Violates Copyright Laws, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2007, at B5; Brock Read, Anti-Cheating Crusader Vexes Some Professors, 54 CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. Issue 25, Feb. 29, 2008, at A1, available at
http://chronicle.com/free/v54/i25/25a00101.htm.
97
See Turnitin.com, Proprietary Matching Technology, http://turnitin.com/static/plagiarism.html
(last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
98
See, e.g., CONFERENCE ON COLLEGE COMPOSITION AND COMMUNICATION, CCCC-IP CAUCUS
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING ACADEMIC INTEGRITY AND THE USE OF PLAGIARISM DETECTION
SERVICES (2006), available at http://ccccip.org/files/CCCC-IP-PDS-Statement-final.pdf (arguing somewhat incoherently that antiplagiarism software undermines students‘ authority over the uses of their own
writing and fosters an artificial view of originality and the role of imitation and borrowing in writing).
99
Maria Glod, Score One for McLean High Students; Administration Amends Anti-Cheating Policy
After Protests, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2006, at B1.
100
Glod, McLean Students Sue Anti-Cheating Service, supra note 96.
101
Id.; A.V. v. iParadigms, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008).
102
Glod, McLean Students Sue Anti-Cheating Service, supra note 96.
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Nonetheless, like iParadigms, these services are still vulnerable to claims of
copyright infringement in relation to the web-based material they incorporate into their services.103
Plagiarism detection services rely on access to entire copies of student
term papers and any works from which the student might have illicitly copied.104 Yet the services do not necessarily cause any of the copyrighted
content they process to be displayed to or read by end users.105 As such, antiplagiarism software also presents the paradox of nonexpressive copying:
the service copies copyrighted works in their entirety in order to compute a
result, but the result itself contains none of the copyrighted expression of
the original works.
II. THE DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF NONEXPRESSIVE USE
A. The Principle of Nonexpressive Use
Copyright protects only works that contain original creative expression. As such, copyrighted works are typically capable of enjoyment, appreciation, or at least comprehension by human actors. The enjoyment of
watching a film, listening to music, or reading a book is derived from the
creative expression contained within those objects. We, as viewers, listeners, and readers choose some films, songs, and books over others because of
the quality of their expression. It is convenient to think of these experiential uses as ―expressive‖ in that they relate to, and are motivated by, the expression embedded within a copyrighted work.106 This observation, that
expressive works are usually copied in contemplation of experiential expressive uses, extends to partial copies as well. Because meaning is derived
from context,107 sampling a segment of music might change what that music

103
The fact that apparently the students themselves loaded their papers into the database after accepting a click-wrap agreement weakened the students‘ copyright claim. See A.V., 544 F. Supp. 2d 473,
480 (finding that the parties entered into a valid contractual agreement when plaintiffs clicked ―I Agree‖
to acknowledge their acceptance of the terms of the defendant‘s user agreement).
104
The same issue arises in relation to automated copyright detection technology used for digital
images. See U.S. Patent No. 7,120,274 (filed Dec. 31, 2002) (―Automated copyright detection in digital
images.‖).
105
See infra notes 187–188 and accompanying text.
106
To the extent that this definition of the ―expressive use‖ of a copyrighted work departs from a
conventional understanding, the reader should understand that this Article employs it as a term of art.
107
See RICHARD BANDLER & JOHN GRINDER, REFRAMING 2 (1982) (―In general communication
theory there is a basic axiom that a signal only has meaning in terms of the frame or context in which it
appears.‖); Stanley Fish, Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary,
the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes Without Saying, and Other Special Cases, in IS THERE A TEXT IN
THIS CLASS? 268–92 (1980) (arguing that words only have meaning because of their context).
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expresses, but the end product is expressive in the general sense nonetheless.108
The distinction between expressive and nonexpressive works is already
well recognized in copyright law as the gatekeeper to copyright protection—novels are protected by copyright, telephone books and other uncreative compilations of data are not.109 This Article explores the importance of
the same distinction in relation to potential acts of infringement. In brief,
the argument is that nonexpressive uses of copyrighted works—i.e., acts of
copying that do not communicate the author‘s original expression to the
public—should not generally be regarded as infringing.
The legal status of actual copying for nonexpressive uses was not a
burning issue before digital technology: there simply was no commercially
relevant total literal copying directed towards a nonexpressive end. To illustrate through absurdum, it would be both uncommon and nonsensical to
photocopy Gone With The Wind and then to use it to light a fire. This is
technically a nonexpressive use, but not one that factors heavily in any serious policy discussion. However, digital technology and the increasing
value of metadata have combined to make the legality of nonexpressive copying arguably the most significant issue in copyright law today.
In a world of analog works, nonexpressive uses of copyrighted works
are fairly uncontroversial. The metadata contained in library catalogs, topic
indices, or even plot synopses are unquestionably valuable. Nonetheless,
because such uses do not typically involve copying the work in question,
copyright owners have no legal right to object. Similarly, prior to digital
technology, any instance of actual copying of the copyright owner‘s work
could be assumed to be directed at some expressive end, incendiary uses of
Gone With The Wind notwithstanding. Accordingly, the exclusion of facts
and ideas from copyright subject matter was rarely important in cases of total copying—in an analog world it was almost inconceivable that someone
could make a nonexpressive use of a copyright work that involved physically copying the entire work. However, given the significant role of nonexpressive copying in Internet search engines and other copy-reliant
technologies, the legality of nonexpressive copying is an issue that copyright doctrine must now address.

108
See Andrew Ross, Princes Among Thieves: Sampling in the 80s, ARTFORUM INT‘L, Mar. 2003,
at 249 (discussing the social meaning of sampling in American hip-hop music of the 1980s); see also
David Hesmondhalgh, Digital Sampling and Social Inequality, 15 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 53 (2006)
(summarizing the literature and addressing the social and legal issues of music sampling as cultural
―borrowing‖); Thomas G. Schumacher, ―This Is a Sampling Sport‖: Digital Sampling, Rap Music and
the Law in Cultural Production, 17(2) MEDIA, CULTURE AND SOC‘Y 253, 268 (1995) (arguing that by
facilitating the mixing of different voices in a musical text, sampling technology implicitly challenges
―the concept of the singular artist as the only embodied voice in the text‖). The status of computer programs under this expressive–nonexpressive paradigm is considered below. See infra Part II.A.5.
109
Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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The purpose of this section is to demonstrate three related propositions:
one descriptive, one normative, and one prescriptive. The descriptive proposition is that for the vast majority of works, the copyright owner‘s exclusive rights are implicitly defined and limited in reference to expressive
communication to the public.110 The normative proposition follows from
the descriptive: acts of copying, which by their very nature cannot communicate the author‘s original expression to the public, should not generally be
held to constitute copyright infringement.111 The prescriptive proposition
addresses the implementation of the broader normative claim and argues
that the best way to apply the general principle of nonexpressive use is via
the fair use doctrine. Specifically, the fair use analysis should incorporate
the extent of the nonexpressive nature of the defendant‘s use. For the reasons detailed below, nonexpressive use is not precisely a free-standing defense to copyright infringement.112 Instead, it is a consideration that
permeates and informs the application of the fair use doctrine.113 These
propositions are consistent with the goals of copyright generally and existing copyright doctrine.
The express purpose of the Copyright Clause in the U.S. Constitution
is ―to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.‖114 Copyright exists
to encourage the creativity of authors and to promote the creation and dissemination of information.115 As the Supreme Court has noted on a number
of occasions, the promotion of science and the useful arts requires a balance
between ―the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society‘s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the
other hand.‖116 Where the law strikes that balance dictates what the public
can copy and what authors can control. Just as importantly, it also mediates
relationships between different generations of authors: initial authors and
those who build upon their works.117 Thus, while copyright aims to give authors an incentive to create and share their works, it also strives to provide
subsequent authors with sufficient ―breathing space‖ to make their own ad-

110
Abraham Drassinower makes a similar point in his characterization of copyright as ―an exclusive
right of public presentation.‖ Abraham Drassinower, Authorship as Public Address: On the Specificity
of Copyright Vis-à-vis Patent and Trade-Mark, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 199, 204.
111
It is important to note that for these purposes, ―the public‖ includes individual consumers and
thus nonexpressive use is not a synonym for personal use.
112
See infra Part II.B.
113
See infra Part II.C.
114
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
115
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
116
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (quoting Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
117
See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997) (discussing sequential innovation in copyright and patent law).
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ditive contributions.118 The copyright system is predicated both on the existence of certain rights to protect authors from unfair competition, and on
significant gaps in those rights that give other authors freedom to breathe.
Viewing copyright in terms of the communication of the expressive
elements of the author‘s work is consistent with both economic and rightsbased understandings of copyright. For the economist, copyright creates
certain exclusive rights to give authors an incentive to invest in the creation
of works that would otherwise be freely copied. Copyright protection thus
allows authors to internalize more of the benefits of their creations, and thus
makes them more likely to want to create in the first place. The natural
rights argument for copyright is primarily an extension of the Lockean
framework of labor as the basis of property ownership of intangibles.119
However, this justification for property does little by itself to establish either its form or its limitations.120 ―Personhood‖ provides an alternative nonutilitarian view of copyright, the premise being that ―property provides a
unique or especially suitable mechanism for self actualization, for personal
expression, and for dignity and recognition as an individual person.‖121 In
either case, the guiding principle of copyright is that one should generally
not be entitled to offer the author‘s copyrighted expression to the public as a
substitute for the work of the author.
Copyright consists of a bundle of discrete exclusive rights, such as the
reproduction right, the derivative right, and the public performance and display rights.122 These rights are defined, articulated, and limited by a number
118

E.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 933 (2005); Sony,
464 U.S. at 479 (―The fair use doctrine must strike a balance between the dual risks created by the copyright system: on the one hand, that depriving authors of their monopoly will reduce their incentive to
create, and, on the other, that granting authors a complete monopoly will reduce the creative ability of
others.‖).
119
See 2 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 27 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988). As Locke
famously argued:
Every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The
Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then
he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour
with, and joyned [sic] to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.
Id. But note that contrary to a strict Lockean approach, copyright law in the United States requires a
minimal threshold of creativity in addition to mere ―sweat of the brow.‖ For a recent application of
Locke to intangibles, see Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2009).
120
For two quite different views of Locke‘s implications for intellectual property, compare Wendy
J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993), which argues that natural rights theory is necessarily concerned with the rights of the public as well as with the rights of those whose labors create intellectual
products, with Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988), which
argues that Locke‘s labor theory can be used to justify intellectual property without many of the problems that attend its application to physical property.
121
Hughes, supra note 120, at 330; see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood,
34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982) (―[T]o achieve proper self-development—to be a person—an individual needs some control over resources in the external environment.‖).
122
17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(6) (2006).
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of initially judge-made doctrines, such as the idea–expression distinction,
the threshold of substantial similarity, and the fair use doctrine.123 As this
section explores in more detail below, these doctrines typically limit copyright protection to the expressive aspects of original works of authorship in
a way that confirms the place of public communication at the heart of copyright. This point is important because once it is understood that copyright‘s
primary function is to protect the author from the threat of expressive substitution, the case in favor of nonexpressive uses becomes almost selfevident. Standing alone, a nonexpressive use carries no threat of expressive
substitution; such uses should thus fall outside the scope of an author‘s entitlement.124
Copyright‘s focus on acts that have the potential to communicate the
author‘s original expression is immediately apparent in the exclusion of
facts and ideas from protection by copyright.125 Nonetheless, the centrality
of expressive substitution does not rest on the idea–expression distinction
alone. A number of other significant copyright doctrines also demonstrate
that communication to the public is the touchstone of copyright infringement. In particular, the communication of original expression to the public
defines the metes and bounds of the publisher‘s collective right in Section
201(c) of the Copyright Act; it defines the threshold of substantial similarity
which is the test of copyright infringement; furthermore it explains why
courts exclude unpublished drafts from copyright liability altogether.126
However, it is not immediately apparent that communication to the public is
a particularly useful lens through which to view the protection of computer
software under copyright law. These topics, including the exceptional status of computer software, are now explored in detail.
1. The Exclusion of Nonexpressive Elements from Copyright Subject
Matter.—Copyright in an expressive work does not confer any exclusive
rights in the facts, ideas, concepts, or discoveries contained in that work,
regardless of the form in which the work describes, explains, or illustrates
them.127 This principle, often simply abbreviated to the ―idea–expression

123
The Copyright Act of 1976 also reflects the idea–expression distinction and the fair use doctrine.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 107. But these doctrines remain essentially common law features of the copyright system.
124
Note as an analogy the case of Smith v. United States, in which Justice Scalia concludes that
―[t]o use an instrumentality ordinarily means to use it for its intended purpose.‖ 508 U.S. 223, 227
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (holding that an individual who traded his gun for drugs had not ―used‖ a
firearm for the purposes of the enhanced criminal sentencing provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)). See
also Andrew S. Gold, Absurd Results, Scrivener‘s Errors, and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. CIN. L.
REV. 25, 43 (2006).
125
See infra Part II.A.1.
126
See infra Parts II.A.2–4.
127
17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985)
(holding that ―no author may copyright facts or ideas‖).
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distinction,‖ is longstanding at common law and was expressly incorporated
into the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act.128
At least since Baker v. Selden in 1879, courts have recognized that
―there is a clear distinction between the book, as such, and the art which it
is intended to illustrate.‖129 The distinction holds even in those unusual cases where the true value of the work lies in the methods, systems, and ideas
it discloses, rather than in the author‘s expression of those concepts.130 In
Selden, for example, the plaintiff had developed a novel and useful method
of bookkeeping, the practice of which created value regardless of how and
from what source a bookkeeper learned the method.131 Nonetheless, the
plaintiff‘s copyright in his instructional material was limited to the expression of his useful methods and did not encompass the methods themselves.132 Of course, in most cases, protecting the unique expression of an
idea is sufficient to ensure that the author will be able to appropriate a return on her investment.
Copyright law also clearly distinguishes between facts and the expression of facts, providing no protection for the former and only limited protection for the latter.133 In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co., Inc., the Supreme Court ruled that copying listings from a telephone directory did not infringe the copyright in that directory because the
information itself was not copyrightable.134 As the Court explained, facts—
whether they are telephone numbers and addresses or the details of historical occurrences—are not ―original‖ to the author.135 The author‘s copyright,

128
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) provides: ―In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such a
work.‖
129
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879). ―Art‖ and ―illustrate‖ are not meant in the aesthetic
sense in this context.
130
Id. Note also that the copyright protection available for maps is somewhat thin as a result. See
1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[A] and the cases cited therein.
131
Id. at 99–100. Selden‘s system may well have been patentable under today‘s standards. See
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that a patent on a data processing system is valid). But see Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme
Court has never endorsed the Federal Circuit‘s ―useful, concrete, and tangible result‖ test for patentable
processes). See generally Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes
from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1924 (2007) (arguing that thin copyright protection for computer programs is especially appropriate given the availability of patent protection for program innovations).
132
Baker, 101 U.S. at 103-04.
133
See Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (holding that facts
are not copyrightable and that the copyright in a factual compilation is thin).
134
Id. at 362-63.
135
Id. at 348 (―[C]opyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that are original to the author.‖).
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therefore, did not cover the facts themselves.136 The Feist Court further held
that the expression of those facts was not protectable, because the selection
and alphabetical arrangement of those facts in the telephone directory was
―so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever.‖137
Through the idea–expression distinction, copyright law protects the
expressive elements of the author‘s work while guaranteeing subsequent authors the necessary breathing space to make their own contributions by adding to, reusing, or reinterpreting the facts and ideas embodied in the original
work. Subsequent authors may not compete with the copyright owner by
offering her original expression to the public as a substitute for the copyright owner‘s work, but they are free to compete with their own expression
of the same facts, concepts, and ideas. Accordingly, the idea–expression
distinction is a central element of the balance between the interests of authors in preventing the exploitation of their writings and society‘s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce.138
The exclusion of facts and ideas from the ambit of copyright protection
applies with equal force to nonexpressive copying in the digital age. In
spite of the fact that metadata is increasingly valuable in the information
age, it is no more copyrightable than it was 100 years ago. The undisputed
value of individual facts, such as the title of a book or its location in a library, does not change the copyright status of those facts. As a general rule,
metadata is not subject to copyright protection: one can extract and reproduce facts, names, and dates from a newspaper article, or ideas and
processes from an instructional text, without infringing the author‘s copyright.139 Whether Congress should, or even could, alter the traditional contours of copyright by extending its protection to facts and ideas merits
debate, but there is no doubt that copyright law currently offers no such
protection.140
The idea–expression distinction limits the rights of the copyright owner
to the expressive elements of the author‘s work: in the analog context, this
is achieved by simply holding that the copying of facts and ideas alone does
136

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (―No author may
copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates.‖).
137
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 362 (holding that the selection, coordination, and arrangement of Rural‘s
white pages did not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright protection); see also
Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., v. West Publ‘g Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that West‘s factual enhancements to judicial opinions could be reasonably viewed as obvious, typical, and lacking even
minimal creativity).
138
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); see also Warner
Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) (describing the idea–expression
distinction as ―an effort to enable courts to adjust the tension between these competing effects of copyright protection‖).
139
See Feist, 499 U.S. 340; Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
140
See generally Jonathan Band & Makoto Kono, The Database Protection Debate in the 106th
Congress, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 869 (2001) (discussing legislative proposals to provide database protection).
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not constitute infringement. Preserving the functional force of the idea–
expression distinction in the digital context requires a slightly different application: copying for purely nonexpressive purposes, such as the automated extraction of data, should not be regarded as infringing.
2. The Collective Work Right.—The collective work right also demonstrates that communication to the public is the touchstone of copyright infringement. The Copyright Act gives authors the exclusive right to reproduce their works in copies. The Act, however, also confers a special
privilege on the owners of collective works, such as magazines and newspapers, which allows them to reproduce and distribute individual contributions as part of the collective work and revisions thereof.141 The collective
work right creates an apparent conflict with the general reproduction right
by allowing magazines and newspapers to reproduce the works of individual authors without their consent in certain circumstances. That conflict
came to a head in New York Times v. Tasini.142 In that case, six freelance
authors sued a group of publishers, including the Times Company, for placing articles written by the authors into third party electronic databases without the authors‘ consent. The publishers relied on their ―‗privilege‘‖,
contained in Section 201(c) of the Copyright Act, to reproduce and distribute the freelance authors‘ contributions as part of a revision to a collective
work.143
The Supreme Court‘s resolution of the conflict between the general reproduction right and the collective work right confirms the centrality of
public perception and expressive communication to the public in determining the rights of the copyright owner. In Tasini, the Supreme Court rejected
the Times Company‘s broad construction of its collective right, holding that
because the articles in question were ―presented to, and retrievable by, the
user in isolation, clear of the context the original print publication presented,‖ they did not qualify as part of a revision to the original collective
work.144
The defendants in Tasini had argued that their conversion of printed
back issues to an electronic form amounted to revision of the collective
work, and was thus sheltered under Section 201(c) of the Act.145 From the
Times Company‘s perspective, electronic storage was no different from the
conversion of newsprint to microfilm.146 As with the electronic database,
microfilm required archiving the entire issue to facilitate later retrieval of
specific articles. The Court, however, held that what mattered was not how
the articles were stored, but how they were retrieved and displayed to us141
142
143
144
145
146

17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2006).
N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
Id. at 491-92.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 501.
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ers.147 Unlike microfilm files, the database presented the individual articles
to the user devoid of their initial context.148 The Court‘s view was that only
user perception mattered and that whether the articles were stored in their
initial sequence was irrelevant to both readers and authors alike. 149 The
Court thus held that ―[i]n determining whether the Articles have been reproduced and distributed as part of a revision of the collective works in issue, we focus on the Articles as presented to, and perceptible by, the user of
the Databases.‖150
Although Tasini is not an instance of nonexpressive use, it nonetheless
supports the proposition that acts of copying that do not communicate the
author‘s original expression to the public do not constitute copyright infringement. By defining the scope of the publishers‘ collective works privilege in terms of what is communicated to the public and dismissing the
relevance of unseen uses within the defendants‘ databases, the Court reinforced that expressive communication to the public is the touchstone of
copyright infringement.
3. Substantial Similarity.—The centrality of expressive communication to the public is inherent in the tests applied by the courts to determine
the threshold of infringement—the tests that determine when some copying
becomes too much copying. As discussed in more detail below, the application of the test of substantial similarity further demonstrates that copying
which does not interfere with the exclusivity of the copyright owner‘s
communication of her work to the public does not infringe the exclusive
rights of the author.151
The copyright owner‘s exclusive right to ―reproduce the copyrighted
work in copies‖ extends to both exact and inexact reproductions.152 In both
cases, however, the Copyright Act leaves the threshold of reproduction—
the question of how much of the copyrighted work must be copied—
undefined. In cases of ―nonliteral infringement,‖—where the accused work
is not an exact copy of the copyright owner‘s work—courts assess whether

147

Id. at 503–04 (―The crucial fact is that the Databases, like the hypothetical library, store and retrieve articles separately within a vast domain of diverse texts. Such a storage and retrieval system effectively overrides the Authors‘ exclusive right to control the individual reproduction and distribution of
each Article.‖) (citations omitted).
148
Id. at 501.
149
Id. at 501 n.9.
150
Id. at 499 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
151
‖Substantial similarity‖ in this sense should not be confused with what is more properly termed
―probative similarity,‖ which is the circumstantial evidence of copying founded upon the unlikely similarity between the accused work and the purported original. See Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., Inc.,
720 F. Supp. 1353, 1358 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
152
17 U.S.C. § 106(1); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (―[T]he
question is whether the part so taken is substantial.‖) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the allegedly infringing work possesses a ―substantial similarity‖ to the copyrighted work.153
Courts define the threshold of substantial similarity in reference to the
perspective of the ordinary observer.154 Infringement is defined in reference
to the perspective of the consuming public, because the copyright owner‘s
―legally protected interest is not, as such, his reputation . . . but his interest
in the potential financial returns from his [work] which derive from the lay
public‘s approbation of his efforts.‖155 As such, the tests of substantial similarity provide further evidence that copyright primarily protects the author
against expressive substitution.
Courts also apply the threshold of substantial similarity in cases of
fragmented actual copying, such as in music sampling or collage.156 For example, in Newton v. Diamond, the plaintiff alleged that the Beastie Boys
had infringed his copyright in a musical composition by including a six
second sample of a sound recording in their own musical creation, ―Pass the
Mic.‖157 The Beastie Boys had obtained a license with respect to the sound
recording, but had not thought it necessary to seek a license from the composer given their limited use and the sparse nature of Newton‘s original
composition.158
Where the defendant copies a portion of the plaintiff‘s work exactly or
nearly exactly, without appropriating the work‘s overall essence or structure, the courts apply a test of ―fragmented literal similarity‖ to determine if
the substantial similarity threshold has been met.159 In cases of fragmented
literal similarity, courts determine whether the copying amounts to infringement ―by considering the qualitative and quantitative significance of
153
See Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 131 (2d
Cir. 2003); Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992).
154
See Shine v. Childs, 382 F. Supp. 2d 602, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (summarizing authorities).
155
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (footnotes omitted); see also Warner Bros.,
Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983).
156
See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that ―the substantiality
requirement applies throughout the law of copyright‖). As David Nimmer notes, the Sixth Circuit‘s
Bridgeport decision suggests otherwise; however, that decision is almost certainly in error on this point.
See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][2][b]; Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d
792 (6th Cir. 2005).
157
Newton, 388 F.3d at 1191.
158
The sample corresponds to three notes on the original composition, C-D flat-C, over a held C
note. The score to ―Choir‖ also indicates that the entire song should be played in a largo/senza-misura
tempo, meaning ―slowly or without-measure.‖ Id. Note that sound recordings and their underlying
compositions are separate and distinct copyrighted works. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2), (7).
159
As the Second Circuit explained in Twin Peaks, ―the concept of similarity embraces not only
global similarities in structure and sequence, but localized similarity in language. In both cases, the trier
of fact must determine whether the similarities are sufficient to qualify as substantial.‖ Twin Peaks
Prods. v. Publ‘ns Int‘l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1372 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d
1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002) (―[T]he work may copy only a small part of the copyrighted work but do so
word-for-word. If this fragmented copy is important to the copyrighted work, and of sufficient quantity,
then it may support a finding of substantial similarity.‖).
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the copied portion in relation to the plaintiff‘s work as a whole.‖160 Applying this test to the Beastie Boys appropriation of a fragment of Newton‘s
original musical composition, ―C– - D flat– - C, over a held C note,‖ the
court found that ―no reasonable juror could find the sampled portion of the
composition to be a quantitatively or qualitatively significant portion of the
composition as a whole.‖161
This focus on the qualitative and quantitative significance of the copied
portion in the plaintiff‘s work is consistent with the prohibition against expressive substitution. Even where some of the copyright owner‘s original
expression has been copied directly, such copying does not rise to the level
of infringement unless the expression was significant, in either quantity or
quality, in the author‘s original work. Just as copyright law does not prevent the copying of facts and ideas, it also permits copying of trivial expressive elements from an existing work, because to do so does not unfairly
compete with the copyright owner.162 In other words, trivial copying of expressive elements is not copyright infringement because it does not interfere
with the copyright owner‘s exclusive right to communicate her work to the
public.
The law relating to fragmented literal similarity not only shows that
communication of protected expression to the public defines and limits the
copyright owner‘s exclusive rights. It also demonstrates that acts of copying that do not communicate the author‘s original expression to the public
do not generally constitute copyright infringement.
4. Allegations of Intermediate Copying in Hollywood.—Meritless claims of copyright infringement are a recognized cost of doing business in
Hollywood.163 Some of these claims are merely opportunistic, while others
are motivated by the plaintiff‘s genuine belief that all his or her own ideas
are unique and that there are no coincidences. Madrid v. Chronicle Books
is representative of the latter phenomenon.164 In that case, the author of a
one-page poem about a land of monsters who are afraid of human children
160
Newton, 388 F.3d at 1195 (citing Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569, 570 n.1 (9th
Cir. 1987)); see also Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 289–90 (D.N.J. 1993); 4 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][2][a], at 13-57–58.
161
Newton, 388 F.3d at 1195.
162
Id. at 1193 (―The principle that trivial copying does not constitute actionable infringement has
long been a part of copyright law.‖); id. at 1195 (―[T]he dispositive question is whether the copying goes
to trivial or substantial elements.‖).
163
Matthew Belloni, THR Esquire, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, June 26, 2007 (―Like expensive CGI
and flashy premieres, defending copyright lawsuits by writers who think their screenplays have been
ripped off is just another cost of doing business for studios.‖); Verne Gay, Flash!: The Latest Entertainment News and More . . ., NEWSDAY, Jan. 30, 1998, at A12 (in thanking the studios for defending
against a claim that his screenplay for the movie Twister had stolen from another screenplay, Michael
Crichton said: ―I hope it will usher in a new era where studios fight these frivolous charges and don‘t
treat it as a cost of doing business‖).
164
Madrid v. Chronicle Books, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Wyo. 2002).
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alleged that the Pixar film Monsters, Inc. infringed her copyright.165 The
court held, however, that the inverted plot of monsters afraid of children
was generic.166 Other cases involve works with similar themes,167 similar
descriptive titles applied to the same general subject,168 or similarities discernable only to the plaintiffs themselves.169
Confronted with motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs often urge
the courts to allow them to scrutinize every single draft of the defendant‘s
screenplay, in the hope that some earlier version of the work will disclose a
greater resemblance to their own copyrighted work than the finished film
does.170 Courts invariably deny these requests.171 The reasons behind the
denials provide an important insight into the structure of copyright law.
Courts refuse to entertain discovery with respect to early drafts of a
noninfringing final work precisely because infringement requires at least
165

Id. at 1234.
Id. Two antecedents spring immediately to mind. First, E.T. hiding in the cupboard from Elliot.
E.T.: THE EXTRA-TERRESTRIAL (Universal Pictures 1982). Second, Max‘s dominion over the fearful
monsters in Where The Wild Things Are. MAURICE SENDAK, WHERE THE WILD THINGS ARE (1963).
167
For example, in Litchfield v. Spielberg the author of a musical play about two aliens stranded at
the North Pole unsuccessfully accused the producers of the motion picture E.T.: The Extra-Terrestrial of
infringement. See 736 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding no substantial similarity between the
sequences of events, mood, dialogue, and characters of the two works); see also Warner Bros., Inc. v.
Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 235, 243 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that the protagonist in the television series The Greatest American Hero was not sufficiently similar to the D.C. Comic‘s Superman character to warrant consideration of the plaintiff‘s copyright infringement claim by a jury; as the court
observed, ―[i]n the genre of superheroes, Hinkley follows Superman as, in the genre of detectives, Inspector Clouseau follows Sherlock Holmes‖).
168
In Davis v. United Artists, Inc., the author of the 1972 Vietnam novel entitled ―Coming Home‖
failed to demonstrate copyright infringement in relation to a 1978 Vietnam film also titled ―Coming
Home.‖ 547 F. Supp. 722, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding no similarity between the two works). In
Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., the author of the autobiographical policeman‘s tale Fort Apache unsuccessfully alleged that the Time Life film Fort Apache, The Bronx amounted to copyright infringement.
615 F. Supp. 430, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that no reasonable observer could find substantial similarity and that ―[a]ny similarity that may exist is either trivial, abstract or non-protectible as a matter of
law‖).
169
For example, in Stromback v. New Line Cinema, the author of a screenplay outline about a callous reporter who brings down a corrupt governor accused the writers of the film Little Nicky of copyright infringement; Little Nicky is a comedy about the Devil and his three sons, one of whom, played by
Adam Sandler, has a speech impediment. See 384 F.3d 283, 297 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding no similarity
between the works other than at the most superficial level). Equally incomprehensible is the claim in
Flaherty v. Filardi, in which the producers of Bringing Down the House, an odd-couple film about a
lonely tax attorney who meets a woman on the Internet who, unknown to him, happens to be in prison,
were alleged to have infringed the copyright of the screenplay Amoral Dilemma, the rather grim story of
a disaffected young Manhattan insurance attorney who knowingly corresponds with a death row prisoner. See 388 F. Supp. 2d 274, 279–81 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
170
See, e.g., Stromback, 384 F.3d 283; Flaherty, v. Filardi, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69202, at *8–9
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2007) (copyright claim to interim drafts of a published non-infringing final work
dismissed as a matter of law); Walker, 615 F. Supp. at 434 (request to discover drafts denied).
171
See Walker, 615 F. Supp. at 435 (noting that courts routinely reject requests to consider earlier
drafts of screenplays).
166
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some potential interference with the copyright owner‘s expectation of exclusivity. As noted in Davis v. United Artists, ―the ultimate test of infringement must be the film as produced and broadcast, we do not consider
the preliminary scripts.‖172 Courts do not refuse to examine interim drafts
merely because of judicial economy; as the Second Circuit noted in Warner
Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., ―a defendant may legitimately
avoid infringement by intentionally making sufficient changes in a work
which would otherwise be regarded as substantially similar to that of the
plaintiff‘s.‖173
The refusal of courts to entertain copyright infringement allegations in
relation to unpublished drafts and preliminary scripts demonstrates the practical importance of a focus on expressive substitution. Because the copyright owner‘s rights are generally limited to the communication of their
original expression to the public, even if it were not in the public domain, a
filmmaker would be perfectly entitled to start with Jane Austen‘s Emma and
rework the plot over and over again until she comes out with Clueless.174
Intermediate scripts that never see the light of day do not communicate the
author‘s original expression to the public and thus cannot constitute copyright infringement.
5. Computer Software: An Exception?—Copyright protection for computer software has long been a source of controversy and disquiet.175 Although the broad language of the statutory definition of ―literary works‖ in
the Copyright Act includes computer programs,176 treating software as a
work of literature presents something of a contradiction. The 1976 Copy172
Davis, 547 F. Supp. at 724 n.9 (citing Fuld v. Nat‘l Broad. Co., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 877, 882 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 1975)); see also Stromback, 384 F.3d at 299 (―In deciding infringement claims, courts have
held that only the version of the alleged infringing work presented to the public should be considered.‖);
Madrid v. Chronicle Books, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1234 (D. Wyo. 2002) (―Since a court considers the
works as they were presented to the public, discovery in this case . . . would be pointless.‖) (internal quotation marks omitted); Walker, 615 F. Supp. at 434 (―The Court considers the works as they were presented to the public.‖).
173
Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing 3 NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[B] at 13-38.1 to -38.2; Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498,
501 (2d Cir. 1982); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 904, 913 & n.11 (2d Cir. 1980)).
174
CLUELESS (Paramount 1995).
175
For a range of opinions, see Jane C. Ginsburg, Four Reasons and a Paradox: The Manifest Superiority of Copyright over Sui Generis Protection of Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2559
(1994); Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs,
41 STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1989); and Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV 2308 (1994).
176
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (―literary works‖ includes works ―expressed in words, numbers, or other
verbal or numerical symbols or indicia‖); see also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 16 (1978) (concluding that ―it was clearly the intent of
Congress to include computer programs within the scope of copyrightable subject matter in the Act of
1976‖); but see Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for
Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663.
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right Act clearly states that copyright protection does not extend to any
―process, system, [or] method of operation . . . .‖177 And yet, thanks to an
amendment made in 1980, the Act clearly extends copyright protection to
computer programs, which are defined as ―a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a
certain result.‖178 A ―set of instructions‖ used ―in order to bring about a certain result‖ appears to be the very essence of the ―process, system, method
of operation‖ exclusion under Section 102(b).
With this contradiction in mind, it is hardly surprising that the general
theory of copyright advanced in this Article—the centrality of expressive
substitution—does not fit perfectly to software.179 Users do not typically
copy copyrighted computer programs so that they can imbibe the artistry of
the programmer‘s expression. In most cases no human being ever directly
observes that expression. Instead, the copyrighted software sends a series
of commands to a computer (usually via a software platform and an operating system) which brings about a certain result such as launching a word
processing program or a video game. Aspects of the word processor or the
video game may themselves be expressive, but it is something of a stretch
to argue that the underlying computer program is itself used expressively.
To be clear, in terms of copyrighted subject matter, a computer program
should be considered to be expressive. However, the ordinary use of a
computer program is more functional than expressive. The distinction between expressive and nonexpressive uses is not intended to eviscerate copyright protection for computer software.180 As the preceding discussion
makes clear, the rational justification for copyright is generally that it protects the author against expressive substitution—the anomalous nature of
computer software points to a different basis for attaching copyright protection and thus does not admit a defense of nonexpressive use to the same extent. In sum, computer software should continue to be treated as
exceptional—nonexpressive use should not be regarded as a defense to ordinary acts of software piracy.181

177
17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Exclusive rights in processes and methods of opperation are generally left
to the patent system. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
178
Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. 96-517, sec. 10, 94
Stat. 3028; 17 U.S.C. § 101, as amended by Pub. L. 96-517, Sec. 10(a).
179
The same objections could be raised with respect to the copyright protection of architectural
plans, and the following discussion applies mutatis mutandis to that subject matter. The Berne Convention Implementation Act (1988) and the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act (1990) recognize
two separate forms of protection for architectural works, one for architectural plans and the other for
structures based on such plans. For an overview, see 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08.
180
As will be explained in more detail below, a use that effectively undermines the rationale of
copyright protection for a particular class of work can hardly be regarded as fair. See infra Part II.C.
181
However, as noted below, the nonexpressive use analysis still provides a useful framework for
understanding software reverse engineering cases. See infra note 254 and accompanying text.
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The difference between copyright in software and in ―normal‖ literary
works is apparent from the case law relating to intermediate copying. As
discussed in the previous subsection, in the context of the motion picture
industry, courts have refused to entertain the notion that intermediate scripts
that never see the light of day could result in copyright infringement. In
contrast, in software reverse engineering cases, courts take the allegation of
infringement via intermediate copying seriously as a potential basis for infringement.182 Nonetheless, in the case of computer software, the intermediate copying required for reverse engineering has invariably been found to
constitute fair use.
We should not be particularly troubled that statutory accretions to the
copyright system such as computer software and architectural plans do not
conform to the general theory outlined in this Article. While the introduction of these non-native species has certainly altered copyright‘s landscape,
their mere existence should not prevent us from articulating a coherent
theory with respect to subject matter indigenous to copyright. The general
theory that expressive substitution is fundamental to copyright infringement
necessarily makes an exception for works that consist of the ―process,‖
―system,‖ or ―method of operation‖ designed to bring about a certain result.
This is the difference between a general theory and a universal one.
*

*

*

This section has explored the centrality of expressive substitution to a
variety of doctrines and applications: the idea–expression distinction, substantial similarity, the collective work right, and finally, the refusal of
courts to entertain infringement actions solely based on unpublished intermediate drafts of literary works. With the exception of anomalous subject
matter such as software, copyright law appears to embrace a general concept of expressive substitution. To the extent that communication of original expression to the public is the touchstone of copyright infringement, it
follows that copyright liability should not ordinarily be found in circumstances where the use in question is incapable of giving rise to any expressive communication. Once the pivotal nature of expressive substitution to
copyright infringement is properly understood, the implications for copyreliant technologies crystallize: the nonexpressive use of a copyrighted
work should not ordinarily result in copyright infringement. To be clear,
nonexpressive uses are merely a subset of uses that do not create any risk of
expressive substitution; the advance of digital technology has made that
subset increasingly important, however.
182

See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm‘t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 599 (9th Cir. 2000);
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518–19 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that files and printouts created during the reverse engineering process meet the requirements for being a ―copy‖ and
―therefore fall[] squarely within the category of acts that are prohibited‖).
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B. Doctrinal Incorporation of Nonexpressive Use
As discussed above, the general principle of nonexpressive use—that
acts of copying which do not communicate the author‘s original expression
to the public should not be held to constitute copyright infringement—flows
naturally from an analysis of existing copyright doctrines. Just as authors
possess no copyright in the facts and ideas contained within their works, the
rights of authors to control the copying of their works should not generally
include copying that offers no possibility of expressive substitution because
it is entirely nonexpressive in nature. As the doctrinal survey in section A
demonstrates, authors possess a set of limited and largely economic rights
to control the expressive uses of their works. Except in already anomalous
cases such as computer software, extending those rights to encompass nonexpressive uses would constitute a significant departure from existing copyright principles. The preceding discussion has established the general
principle of nonexpressive use; we now turn to the prescriptive implications
of that principle. Specifically, this section demonstrates why the principle
of nonexpressive use should be applied in the context of copyright‘s fair use
doctrine and not as a freestanding defense to copyright infringement. The
next section then explains how nonexpressive use fits within a traditional
fair use analysis.
How does the principle of nonexpressive use relate to copy-reliant
technology? As set forth in more detail below, the copying at issue in the
case studies discussed in Part I was manifestly different from the usual copyright infringement scenario. Entire works were copied, but the purpose of
that copying was not to convey the work‘s expressive qualities to the public, but rather to enable banks of microprocessors to index the content of
those works and to generate metadata about the works. Explicit recognition
of this principle of nonexpressive use would significantly clarify the legal
status of copy-reliant technologies such as Internet search engines, plagiarism detection software, and the Google Book project. However, acknowledging the principle of nonexpressive use raises the subsidiary question of
how to implement the principle in the law.
Although a court could rule that the use of a copyrighted work that
does not communicate its expressive content is per se not a violation of the
copyright owner‘s rights under Section 106 of the Copyright Act, this Article does not recommend that course for three reasons. First, the statutory
text of Section 106 does not directly support the concept of nonexpressive
use. For example, Section 106(1) gives copyright owners the exclusive
rights ―to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies.‖183 The Act defines
―[c]opies‖ as ―material objects . . . in which a work is fixed . . . and from
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-

183

17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006).
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cated.‖184 Thus, the requirement for a copy is only that the work is capable
of being perceived, not that anyone actually perceives it and uses it expressively. The second reason not to interpret Section 106 as providing a blanket exclusion for nonexpressive use is that, as noted above, the principle
may not apply to some of copyright‘s more irregular subject matter, such as
computer software and architectural plans. The exceptional status of computer software in particular suggests that the principle requires a more context-specific implementation. The third reason not to adopt a per se rule
with respect to nonexpressive use is that in many contexts the concept is
ambiguous. Where the validity of a defendant‘s claim that a particular use
is nonexpressive is contestable, courts may find that adopting a categorical
rule that nonexpressive uses are noninfringing simply shifts the focus of argument from substantive questions to questions of category definition.
Although the principle of nonexpressive use articulated in this Article
is important, it is not free from ambiguity. The extraction of factual information—such as names, dates, and places—is a nonexpressive use, in that it
does not relate to the expression of these facts, but to the facts themselves.185 Similarly, generating factual information about a work should also be categorized as a nonexpressive use of the underlying work. For
example, publishing the fact that the novel Moby Dick was written by Herman Melville in 1851 and contains the word ―whale‖ 783 times would not
infringe any copyright in the book because this information about the work
is independent of the expressive value of the work.186
Similarly, the nonexpressive use of some copy-reliant technologies is
fairly clear-cut. Plagiarism detection software illustrates one of the less
ambiguous applications of the nonexpressive use principle. These services
rely on access to entire copies of student term papers and any works from
which a student might have copied them; yet the services do not necessarily
display any of the copyrighted content they process to the end users. Plagiarism detection software works by comparing strings of text in new works
to strings of text in existing works.187 If the software finds a match, it indi184

17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (―In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.‖).
186
Moby Dick is in the public domain in the United States and is available at Project Guttenberg at
http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/2701.
187
The similarities between two works can be assessed by simply looking for common strings of
words. See Amy Argetsinger, Technology Snares Cheaters at U-Va.; Physics Professor‘s Computer
Search Triggers Investigation of 122 Students, WASH. POST, May 9, 2001, at A1. However, there are
also various algorithms that can be applied to a document to create a digital fingerprint, which captures
other characteristics of the work. These digital fingerprints allow a document to be characterized by its
structure, vocabulary, and content; they are essentially abstractions of the original documents and allow
for faster comparisons, which will not be as easily deceived by minor text alterations. See, e.g., Khair
Eddin M. Sabri & Jubair J. Al-Ja‘afer, The JK System to Detect Plagiarism, 6(2) J. COMPUTER SCI. &
TECH. 66 (2006). The Turnitin software uses statistical techniques originally designed to analyze brain
185
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cates as much. By itself, the report that a new work is similar to another
work already in the database in no way reproduces or communicates the expressive qualities of either work.188 Of course, most plagiarism software is
also programmed to display the source file from which the work being scrutinized was allegedly copied. This optional feature may indeed be regarded
as expressive, although not necessarily without fair use protection. Nonetheless, many other significant copy-reliant technologies present some degree of ambiguity as to whether they should be regarded as expressive or
nonexpressive.
In both Field and Perfect 10, the courts effectively found that the primary purpose of the copying at issue was nonexpressive. In Field, the court
held that although allowing users to retrieve web pages from the search engine cache also allowed them to be read, the primary use of the cache was
nonexpressive and thus noninfringing.189 The court found that to the extent
that Google itself copied or distributed Field‘s copyrighted works by allowing access to them through cached links, Google had engaged in a fair use
of those copyrighted works.190 The court relied heavily on the differences
between Google‘s use of the works and any expressive or artistic value that
Field‘s work might have otherwise had.191 Although the court did not employ the terminology set forth in this Article, its reasoning illustrates that
the relevant distinction was that Google‘s use was nonexpressive. The
court gave a number of reasons why Google‘s use of the works in the form
of cached links did not serve the same function as the original works. Primarily, the court noted that cached links enable Internet users to detect
changes that have been made to a particular web page over time—changes
which may have important ramifications.192 As the court noted: ―by definition, this information location function cannot be served by the original
Web page alone. To conduct such a comparison, a user would need to
access both Google‘s archival copy of a Web page and the current form of
the Web page on the Internet.‖193 In addition, the court also noted that the
availability of cached links enables users to understand why the search engine indicated that a seemingly irrelevant web page was responsive to their
query.194
waves to compare the fingerprints of student papers to more than a billion documents that have been
fingerprinted in a similar fashion. See Plagiarise. Let No One Else‘s Work Evade Your Eyes, THE
ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 2002 (U.S. Edition).
188
In practice, plagiarism detection providers also issue reports identifying the text allegedly copied
and the source document; however, the basic matching function can be performed with no communication of expression at all.
189
Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115 (D. Nev. 2006).
190
Id. at 1118.
191
Id. at 1118–19.
192
Id.
193
Id. at 1119.
194
Id.
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Although these functions relate to the copyrighted expression contained in the original website, they do not replicate the expressive function
of the original. Axiomatically, the use of a cached version of a web page to
detect changes is a use not served by the original copyrighted work alone.
Likewise, referring to the cache to understand better the relationship between a particular page and a particular search term is also a use not served
by the original copyrighted work alone.195
Perfect 10 presents a similar ambiguity and a similar resolution.196 In
Perfect 10, the thumbnail representations were clearly visible to the public.
The court of appeals, however, found that the thumbnails did not fulfill a
demand for the originals as expressive works.197 The court held that the
plaintiff had raised a prima facie case of infringement because Google‘s
thumbnail representations were literally copied from Perfect 10‘s works and
were displayed by the search engine.198 However, the court found that
Google‘s creation of thumbnail representations did not infringe Perfect 10‘s
rights, in large measure because the purpose of the copying the plaintiff
complained of was a different use, a nonexpressive use.199 The court of appeals distinguished the use of thumbnails by Google as pointing devices
from the use of pictures as expressive works themselves. In the court‘s
words, Google‘s replication of the original works as thumbnails ―served a
different function‖ unrelated to ―artistic expression.‖200 The court further
explained: ―[a]lthough an image may have been created originally to serve
an entertainment, aesthetic, or informative function, a search engine transforms the image into a pointer directing a user to a source of information.‖201 In other words, although the thumbnail representations were
technically a copy of Perfect 10‘s original works, they were not used to fulfill the public‘s demand for small grainy photos of unclad women, but rather as pointing devices to instruct users where they might find the photos
they are looking for.
In both Field and Perfect 10, there was at least the possibility that the
search engine copying could function as an expressive substitute for the
copyright owners‘ original works. Nonetheless, in both cases the courts
found that the copying at issue did not fulfill a demand for the originals as
195
Not all assertions of nonexpressive use deserve equal credence. Reproducing an entire film,
with additional commentary, to explain its nomination for an Academy Award would not likely qualify
as a nonexpressive use. In this example, the fact that the amount of the underlying work copied grossly
exceeds what was necessary gives the lie to the claim that the use was nonexpressive. See infra Part
II.C.3.
196
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).
197
Id. at 721.
198
Id. at 719.
199
Id. at 725 (reversing the district court‘s ruling that the use of thumbnails was not fair use).
200
Id. at 721 (citation and quotation omitted); see also Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811,
819 (9th Cir. 2003).
201
Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 721.
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expressive works.202 In Field, the court found that the mere technical possibility that someone might recall an object from the cache to enjoy its expressive qualities was insufficient to characterize caching in general as an
expressive use of copyrighted works, given that the predominant uses of the
cached content were unrelated to the expressive function of the original
works.203 In Perfect 10, the court acknowledged the possibility that some
users might see the thumbnail representations as substitutes for the originals; however, despite this possibility, the court dismissed the plaintiff‘s
claim of expressive substitution as speculative and unlikely.204 In the
court‘s opinion, because the search engine used thumbnail representations
to show users which websites contained images relevant to their search
terms, they were not substitutes for the originals.205 The potential for expressive and nonexpressive uses to sit side by side in cases such as Field
and Perfect 10 highlights the limits of a strictly categorical approach. This
in turn suggests the need to integrate the issue of nonexpressive use into a
fair use analysis, as explained in section C below.
The Google Book search engine litigation also illustrates the potential
ambiguity of nonexpressive use. Google is in the process of scanning the
text of millions of books in order to create the metadata that drives the
Google Book search engine. The object of all this indiscriminant copying is
the production of metadata—thus, to understand the Google Book controversy, it is first necessary to appreciate the value of metadata in the information age. Information is only useful to the extent that it is relevant,
discernable, and available. There are thousands of volumes of information
in even the smallest libraries; however, these dusty tomes are mere ornaments unless a user has some means to locate a particular book, or better yet
a particular page, that may be of interest. This is the point where metadata
becomes valuable. Metadata refers simply to information about information, or data about data.206 The traditional (and now obsolete) library ―card
catalog‖ is an archetypal metadata repository—the card catalog contains information about the author, title, and subject matter, but it does not contain
the volumes themselves.207 As the quantity of available information in202

Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006); Perfect 10, 487 F.3d 701.
Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1118–19.
204
Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 721.
205
Id. at 724.
206
Metadata is defined as ―structured, encoded data that describe characteristics of informationbearing entities to aid in the identification, discovery, assessment, and management of the described entities.‖ AM. LIBRARY ASS‘N ALCTS CC:DA TASK FORCE ON METADATA, SUMMARY REPORT (June
1999), http://www.libraries.psu.edu/tas/jca/ccda/tf-meta3.html; see also Ganesan Shankaranarayanan &
Adir Evan, The Metadata Enigma, 49 COMMS. ACM 88 (2006) (arguing that most definitions of metadata ignore its richness and complexity).
207
See BARBARA TILLET, WHAT IS FRBR?: A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR THE BIBLIOGRAPHIC
UNIVERSE (Library of Congress Cataloging Distribution Service 2004), available at
http://www.loc.gov/cds/downloads/FRBR.pdf; IFLA STUDY GROUP ON THE FUNCTIONAL
203
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creases, so too does the value of metadata used to organize, search, rank,
and retrieve that information.
The copyright issues relating to Google Book must be analyzed in two
distinct parts: first, the intermediate copying which produces metadata; and
second, the copying and displaying of fragments of books along with search
results. The construction of the Google Book database involves the actual
copying of millions of expressive works for an intermediate purpose that is
itself entirely nonexpressive. In this regard, it is exactly analogous to plagiarism detection software.208 However, while the process of generating data itself is not an expressive use, the search engine linked to that data does
provide expressive snippets of copyrighted books to end users in response
to their search requests.
Does this mean that the intermediate copying performed by Google
should be deemed to be expressive in nature? Although the search engine
displays expressive snippets of books to end users, in most cases those
snippets are too fragmented and insubstantial to amount to infringing copies
of the books themselves. It is conceivable that a three line snippet of a haiku could be infringing by itself, but for most books, the notion that any
three lines could meet the test of substantial similarity is risible.209 However, if Google Book‘s snippets were less abbreviated, they might be coherent
and substantial enough to be infringing. As long as Google Book‘s final
expressive use does not infringe, it should not detract from the nonexpressiveness of an intermediate use.210
In sum, although Internet search engines (and possibly even the Google
Book project) are strong candidates for nonexpressive use, the extent to
which that label actually fits may depend on a detailed assessment of specific facts. For example, the claim of nonexpressive use in relation to an image search engine that reproduced full-scale images as opposed to
thumbnails would be doubtful. The categorization of intermediate nonexpressive uses intertwined with infringing expressive uses is also ambiguous.
To ameliorate this problem, courts should evaluate claims of nonexpressive
use within the context of a fair use analysis rather than adopting a categorical rule. Section C addresses the links between nonexpressive use and fair
use in detail.
REQUIREMENTS FOR BIBLIOGRAPHIC RECORDS, FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR BIBLIOGRAPHIC
RECORDS, FINAL REPORT (1998), http://www.ifla.org/files/cataloguing/frbr/frbr.pdf.
208
Google‘s process for generating the metadata behind its book search engine is also clearly analogous to the intermediate copying approved by numerous federal courts in reverse engineering cases.
See Sag, supra note 4, at 425–28.
209
Note that Google Book treats works such as poetry, dictionaries, drug reference guides, price
guides, and books of quotations differently for this very reason. See Google Book Settlement, available
at http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/help/bin/answer.py?answer=118722 (last visited Aug. 4,
2009).
210
Whether a converse finding that an end product infringes requires treating an intermediate nonexpressive use as expressive is a question for another day.
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C. Fair Use and Nonexpressive Use
Copyright law does not require a radical reinterpretation to accommodate the principle of nonexpressive use. It merely requires applying the existing elements of fair use doctrine to recognize that acts of copying that do
not communicate the author‘s original expression to the public do not typically constitute copyright infringement.
The Copyright Act requires courts to consider four factors in making a
fair use determination. These factors are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of
the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 211

In reality, these factors are neither complete212 nor individually or cumulatively determinative.213 Even the notion that there are four factors is misleading: beneath the statutory factors lies an amalgamation of
interconnected metafactors, subfactors, and presumptions. The implications
of nonexpressive use in relation to fair use are explored below.
1. The ―Purpose and Character‖ of Nonexpressive Uses.—The nonexpressive nature of the defendant‘s use is perhaps most clearly relevant
under the first fair use factor, ―the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.‖214 Recognizing the copyright owner‘s exclusive rights as
implicitly defined and limited in reference to expressive communication to
the public makes sense of both expressive and nonexpressive fair uses. Indeed, recognition of this overarching principle may be the key to rescuing
the concept of transformative use from elastic imprecision.
According to the Supreme Court‘s most recent fair use decision,
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, the first factor turns primarily on:
[W]hether the new use merely supersedes the objects of the original creation . . . or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different
211

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
See Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 394 (4th Cir. 2003) (―These factors are not meant to be exclusive, but rather illustrative, representing only general guidance about the sorts of copying that courts and
Congress most commonly have found to be fair uses.‖) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted);
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 448 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (―The factors
are illustrative, not definitive.‖).
213
See Sag, supra note 4, at 434; see also Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to
Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1564 (2004); David Nimmer, ―Fairest of Them All‖ and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 281 (2003) (―Courts tend first to make a
judgment that the ultimate disposition is fair use or unfair use, and then align the four factors to fit that
result as best they can.‖).
214
17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
212
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character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks,
in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is ―transformative‖. . . . Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a
finding of fair use, . . . the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is
generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. 215

Traditionally, courts apply the concept of transformative use to new expressive uses that ―provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work,
and, in the process, creat[e] a new one.‖216 Transformative use is most obvious when the work is itself transformed; however, in many cases courts
have held that the mere recontextualization of a copyrighted work from one
expressive context to another is sufficient to sustain a finding of fair use—
the work itself need not be altered.217 Understanding the rationale for transformative use is the key to grasping the link between transformative use and
nonexpressive use. The privileged status of transformative uses under the
fair use doctrine allows for the creation of new works from old. This is not
a sufficient explanation, however, because other doctrinal levers, such as a
narrower understanding of the author‘s exclusive right to make derivative
works, could achieve the same effect.218 Beyond a simple enthusiasm for
new works, courts accord special status to transformative uses because they
do not substitute for the author‘s original expression—they do not merely
supersede the objects of the original creation.219 Because of this special status, the greater the extent of transformation, the less significant other factors
weighing against fair use will become.220
Cognizant of the Supreme Court‘s focus on transformative uses, some
courts have simply equated nonexpressive with transformative. In Perfect
10, the court held that Google‘s use of thumbnails in its Internet search engine ―may be more transformative than a parody because a search engine
provides an entirely new use for the original work, while a parody typically
has the same entertainment purpose as the original work.‖221 This seems to
215

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1105, 1111 (1990) (―I believe the answer to the question of justification turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged use is transformative.‖).
216
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
217
See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609–10 (2d Cir. 2006)
(use of promotional posters in a rock biography was ―a purpose separate and distinct from the original
artistic and promotional purpose for which the images were created‖); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain
Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796–98, 800–06 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that photos parodying Barbie by depicting ―nude Barbie dolls juxtaposed with vintage kitchen appliances‖ was a fair use).
218
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006).
219
See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
220
Id.
221
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 721 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding further that
―even making an exact copy of a work may be transformative so long as the copy serves a different
function than the original work.‖ (citing Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818–19 (9th Cir.
2003)).
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be stretching the concept of transformation beyond its natural utility. It
would be better to recognize that uses which do not relate to the expressive
appeal of a work may find favor under the first fair use factor—whether
they qualify as transformative in the expressive sense or not.
By construction, the more nonexpressive the use of a copyrighted work
is, the less it substitutes for the author‘s original expression.222 As such,
courts should regard primarily nonexpressive uses as equivalent (but not
identical) to highly transformative uses—their ―purpose and character‖ is
such that they do not merely supersede the objects of the original creation.223 In addition, the same logic that dictates that the more transformative
a work is, the less significant the other factors become, also applies to nonexpressive uses.224
2. Nonexpressive Use and Commercial Fair Use.—As part of their
consideration of the first factor—―the purpose and character of the use‖—
courts are instructed to consider ―whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.‖225 Although the application
of the fair use doctrine to commercial entities has been uncertain for some
time, due deference to the Supreme Court‘s most recent pronouncement on
the issue and the economic logic of copyright both suggest that commerciality has no per se relevance. The status of commercial fair use has proved to
be confusing, in part because it is so closely linked with the question of
market substitution under the fourth factor.226 Conceiving of copyright as a
set of exclusive rights in relation to the communication of original expression to the public sheds considerable light on the status of commercial uses
under the fair use doctrine. The fact that most copy-reliant technologies are
developed and maintained by commercial entities does not weaken their
claim to fair use. As explained in more detail below, if a use is nonexpressive, its commercial or noncommercial nature is irrelevant because nonexpressive uses do not substitute for the author‘s original expression.
In both Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. and Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court indicated that commercial uses are disfavored under the fair use doctrine.227
Writing for the majority in Sony, Justice Stevens suggested that if Sony‘s
222
The analysis in this section is subject to the caveat regarding computer software and other quasifunctional works discussed in Part II.A.5.
223
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583.
224
See id. at 579.
225
17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006).
226
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit‘s approach to commerciality in Napster defines the concept exclusively in terms of market substitution. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th
Cir. 2001) (holding that ―commercial use is demonstrated by a showing that repeated and exploitative
unauthorized copies of copyrighted works were made to save the expense of purchasing authorized copies‖).
227
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984).
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video cassette recorder ―were used to make copies for a commercial or profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair. The contrary
presumption is appropriate here, however, because the District Court‘s findings plainly establish that time-shifting for private home use must be characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity.‖228 Similarly, the
majority in Harper & Row declared that ―[t]he fact that a publication was
commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh
against a finding of fair use.‖229
However, as the Court later discovered in Campbell, a fixed presumption against commercial fair use is difficult to reconcile with the economic
logic of copyright. As the Court has reaffirmed most recently in Eldred v.
Ashcroft, copyright promotes the creation and publication of free expression
―[b]y establishing a marketable right to the use of one‘s expression.‖230 As
Neil Netanel observes, the great virtue of copyright is that it ―supports a
sector of creative and communicative activity that is relatively free from reliance on state subsidy, elite patronage, and cultural hierarchy.‖231 The virtues of creative production freed from the shackles of patronage and direct
government control apply equally to all forms of private production, regardless of whether they rely on the fair use doctrine or not. Thus, the economic
and political logic of copyright is inconsistent with placing special burdens
on the private sector for no other reason than its pursuit of profit. Noncommercial uses may have other characteristics, such as a greater degree of
spillovers, which justify fair use,232 but there are no inherent differences between the uses of commercial and noncommercial actors. In a modern free
market economy, most copyrighted works of interest to the public at large
are created by private commercial actors. Newspapers, television broadcasts, and Internet search engines are predominantly commercial, and even
though many schools and universities are often operated by ―not for profit‖
corporations, they are still commercial in the sense that they operate on a
fee-for-service basis. As the Supreme Court recognized in Campbell, ―[if]
commerciality carried presumptive force against a finding of fairness, the
presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the
preamble paragraph of § 107, including news reporting, comment, criticism,

228
Sony, 464 U.S. at 449. ―Time-shifting‖ refers to the consumer practice of recording a program
to be viewed at a later, more convenient time. Id. at 418.
229
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
230
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558).
231
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 288
(1996).
232
See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 261 (2007);
Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 51–53 (1997).
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teaching, scholarship, and research, since these activities ‗are generally
conducted for profit in this country.‘‖233
The Court in Campbell rejected the notion that commerciality by itself
had any ―hard presumptive significance.‖234 Instead, the Court adopted a
sliding scale to commercial use, arguing that because ―the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation
of transformative works,‖ then ―the more transformative the new work, the
less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may
weigh against a finding of fair use.‖235 This sliding scale approach to commercial uses makes sense in light of the principle of expressive substitution
articulated in this Article. The hallmark of transformative works protected
by the fair use doctrine is that they do not substitute for the author‘s original
expression, but rather ―add[] something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.‖236 Courts should treat commercial nonexpressive uses similarly: the
more nonexpressive a use is, the less it is capable of substituting for the author‘s original expression.
There is ready support for this position in the case law. In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., an image search case preceding Perfect 10, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the replication of copyrighted images in thumbnails would
not substitute for the full-sized images.237 The court in Perfect 10 likewise
concluded that Google‘s thumbnail representations were unlikely to interfere with the market for Perfect 10‘s original expression.238 The court expressly rejected the application of any commerciality inference or
presumption, noting that ―this presumption does not arise when a work is
transformative because market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred.‖239
3. Nonexpressive Use and ―Amount and Substantiality.‖—The degree to which a use is nonexpressive is also significant in terms of the third
fair use factor, ―the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation

233
510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
3 BOSWELL‘S LIFE OF JOHNSON 19 (G. Hill ed. 1934)) (other citations omitted).
234
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585.
235
Id. at 579 (citations omitted). As Barton Beebe notes, while commentators have assumed that
the commerciality presumption was finally discarded in Campbell, it remains a tenacious meme in the
court of public opinion. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions,
1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 598 (2008).
236
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; see Leval supra note 215, at 1111 (―If . . . the secondary use adds
value to the original—if the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new
information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings—this is the very type of activity that the
fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.‖).
237
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 2003).
238
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 724 (9th Cir. 2007).
239
Id. (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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to the copyrighted work as a whole.‖240 This factor eschews mechanical
quantification and recognizes that the amount of tolerable copying varies
according to both the purpose of the defendant‘s use and the effect of that
use on the copyright owner. The issue at the heart of the third factor is not
simply what percentage of the copyright owner‘s original work has been
taken, but what proportion of the work‘s expressive value has been appropriated. The argument made here is simply that a use properly categorized
as nonexpressive does not substitute for the any of the expressive value of
the author‘s original expression.
Even in the realm of expressive uses, there is no linear relationship between the amount of a work copied and its propensity to fair use. All other
things being equal, the more a defendant copies, the more likely she is to interfere with the copyright owner‘s right to market her works to the public.
Thus, Napster users who trade complete copies of copyrighted music over
the Internet are treated very differently from collage artists who copy only
parts of works and add their own significant creative input.241 But all other
things are rarely equal, and courts have repeatedly found that even total copying of expressive works can be fair use in the right circumstances.
Courts have held that total copying is permissible in personal use cases,
such as those testing the legality of the video cassette recorder and the mp3
player.242 In cases relating to photography and other visual works, courts
have occasionally allowed defendants to reproduce entire images where it
was unlikely that any market harm would result and the defendant‘s purpose required complete reproduction.243

240

17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006). This inquiry can be traced back to Justice Story‘s original formulation of the fair use doctrine in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). In that
case, Justice Story was concerned to protect the ―chief value of the original work‖ against the extraction
of its ―essential parts‖ through the mere ―facile use of scissors‖ or its intellectual equivalent. Id at 345.
241
Compare A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2001) (―Napster users are not fair users.‖), with Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the visual artist Jeff Koons‘s use of fashion photography in collage was fair use).
242
See Recording Indus. Ass‘n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that personal digital music players are legal); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449–50 (1984) (holding that videotape recorders, primarily used for time shifting, are legal); cf. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 1992)
(noting that modifying the way in which an entirely copied video game is played is legal in just the same
way as video recorders that allow the viewer to view the recorded work in a different sequence are legal).
243
See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding
that total copying ―does not necessarily weigh against fair use because copying the entirety of a work is
sometimes necessary to make a fair use of the image‖); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821
(9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that images used for a search engine database are necessarily copied in their
entirety for the purpose of recognition); Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 803 n.8 (9th
Cir. 2003) (holding that ―entire verbatim reproductions are justifiable where the purpose of the work differs from the original‖); Nunez v. Caribbean Int‘l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2000) (concluding that to copy any less than the entire image at issue would have made the picture useless to the story).
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Far from being linear or arithmetic in nature, proper application of the
third factor is contingent upon the purpose and the effect of the defendant‘s
use. As the Supreme Court recognized in Campbell, ―the extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of the use.‖244 In that
case, the Court held that the degree to which rap musicians 2 Live Crew had
copied from Roy Orbison‘s original song, Pretty Woman, must be assessed
in light of their parodic purpose. Because the art of parody ―lies in the tension between a known original and its parodic twin,‖ parody requires copying enough of the original so that the object of derision is made clear to the
audience.245 Just as the extent of permissible copying varies according to
purpose, it also varies according to effect. In Harper & Row, the defendant
magazine, The Nation, copied only a few hundred words from a soon-to-bepublished autobiography of former President Gerald Ford. The Supreme
Court held, however, that this constituted a substantial taking under the
third factor because The Nation had selected its quotes ―precisely because
they qualitatively embodied Ford‘s distinctive expression,‖ had taken ―the
most interesting and moving parts of the entire manuscript,‖ and had structured its article around these quoted excerpts.246 The Court‘s finding in relation to the third factor rests on the finding that The Nation had taken
essentially the heart of the book‘s expressive value.247
Instead of relying on a mechanical quantification of the amount of the
original work used, the third factor asks courts to assess how much of the
value of the original work is present in the allegedly infringing work. 248
Accordingly, the extent to which a use is nonexpressive plays a vital role in
the assessment of the third fair use factor. A nonexpressive use does not
generally substitute for the expressive value of the author‘s original expression, and therefore courts should view it as qualitatively insignificant under
the third factor, even if it involves literal copying of an entire work.
Again, existing case law is consistent with this proposition. In Perfect
10, the court held that although the thumbnails were copies of the original
images, their reduced size and image quality was consistent with their use
as pointing devices, which did not substitute for the expressive value of the
author‘s original expression.249 Consistent with its earlier decision in Kelly,
the court found that the representation of an entire photographic image was

244

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586–87.
Id. at 588.
246
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
247
Id. at 566 (―In view of the expressive value of the excerpts and their key role in the infringing
work, we cannot agree with the Second Circuit that the magazine took a meager, indeed an infinitesimal
amount of Ford‘s original language.‖).
248
See Sag, supra note 4, at 391.
249
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 721–22 (9th Cir. 2007) (―Here, Google uses
Perfect 10‘s images in a new context to serve a different purpose.‖).
245
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reasonable in light of the purpose of an image search engine.250 As the court
explained, while a user can identify relevant text by seeing merely a fraction of it, understanding the relevance of an image requires seeing a representation of the complete image.251 In Perfect 10, as in Kelly, the court
found that the third fair use factor did not weigh in favor of either party.252
Likewise, in Field, the court found that making entire web pages available in the search engine cache served a purpose that could not be effectively accomplished by using only portions of the web pages. The court found
that Google‘s nonexpressive uses of the cached pages—such as verifying
the authenticity of live pages and assessing the relevance of search queries—required caching complete reproductions of the plaintiff‘s web pages.
Accordingly, the district court concluded that because ―Google uses no
more of the works than is necessary in allowing access to them through
‗Cached‘ links, the third fair use factor is neutral, despite the fact that
Google allowed access to the entirety of Field‘s works.‖253
Furthermore, the numerous copyright cases dealing with the practice of
reverse engineering computer software also support the proposition that a
nonexpressive use is qualitatively insignificant under the third factor. In
Sony v. Connectix, for example, the court acknowledged that Connectix had
copied an entire section of Sony‘s software multiple times; however, it concluded that ―in a case of intermediate infringement when the final product
does not itself contain infringing material, this factor is of very little
weight.‖254
The third factor requires a holistic assessment of the extent of appropriation of a work‘s expressive value, measured against the need and justification of the defendant in appropriating it. Accordingly, courts frown upon
nontransformative expressive uses of a copyrighted work, but grant considerable latitude to transformative expressive uses. Similarly, nonexpressive
uses, even those that require total copying, should be generally deemed to
be qualitatively insignificant because they do not substitute for the expressive value of the author‘s original expression.
4. The Market Effect of Nonexpressive Uses.—The fourth fair use factor is ―the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.‖255 The Harper & Row Court described the fourth fair

250

Id. at 724 (citing Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2003)).
Id.
252
Id.; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821.
253
Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1121 (D. Nev. 2006). Presumably, the court would
have come to a different conclusion if it found that the primary use of cached links was to substitute for
the original web page.
254
Sony Computer Entm‘t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 606 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
255
17 U.S.C. § 107(41) (2006).
251
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use factor as ―undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.‖256
Barton Beebe, in contrast, concludes that the fourth factor is ―no factor at
all.‖257 As detailed below, although the fourth factor risks collapsing into
circularity because everything is a potential market effect, courts have in
fact avoided this nadir by applying certain limiting principles that emphasize that the copyright market is limited to expressive substitution. The logical implication of the exclusion of economic consequences that do not arise
from expressive substitution is that to the extent that a use is nonexpressive,
it typically has no cognizable market effect under the fourth factor.
The first step in ascertaining the market effect of an unauthorized use
is to define the relevant market. If the market is defined purely in terms of
that which might be licensed if the law says that it must be licensed, then
the fair use ruling collapses into circularity.258 The concept of market effect
becomes even more elusive if a trial judge adopts the Harper & Row
Court‘s slippery slope presumption. In Harper & Row, the Court announced that ―to negate fair use one need only show that if the challenged
use should become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.‖259 The aggregation of any harm that is likely
to result from widespread use is reasonable in evaluating the fourth factor.
The Court, however, offers no particular reason to presume that all uses
will become widespread.260
Combining the slippery slope of aggregation with a broad concept of
derivative works, copyright owners frequently claim that almost any new
use of their work—either in whole or in part—is part of an unexplored derivative market.261 Taken at face value it becomes impossible for a defendant to prove that her particular use, if widely replicated, would not displace
256

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
Beebe, supra note 235, at 620–21 (―Ultimately, the paradox of the fourth factor is that it is everything in the fair use test and thus nothing. To assert, as a descriptive matter, that it is the most important factor—or, as a normative matter, that it is too important—is meaningless, primarily because it is no
factor, no independent variable, at all.‖) (footnote omitted).
258
James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J.
882, 947–51 (2007). But note that although Gibson describes a one-way ratchet effect, the potential circularity of the fourth factor can be set to spin in either direction: if the use is fair, there is no need to license and thus no harm to the market, thus the use is fair; but equally, if the use is unfair, there is
axiomatically at least one potential licensee (the defendant), and thus the copyright owner‘s market has
been adversely affected.
259
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (internal quotation marks omitted).
260
This is arguably a distortion of the Senate Report, which comments that ―Isolated instances of
minor infringements, when multiplied many times, become in the aggregate a major inroad on copyright
that must be prevented.‖ S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 65 (1975) (emphasis added). Note that in Campbell the
slippery slope presumption is weakened to a matter for consideration, but still without any analysis of
which uses are likely to become widespread and which are not. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc,. 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
261
For example, although it had shown no interest in licensing a derivative of Pretty Woman in the
rap genre before its lawsuit against 2 Live Crew, Acuff-Rose (Roy Orbison‘s publisher) argued that 2
Live Crew‘s parody diminished its potential to do so. See id.
257
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some potential future market in some derivative of the copyright owner‘s
work. As the Second Circuit noted in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., ―were a court automatically to conclude in every case that potential licensing revenues were impermissibly impaired simply because the
secondary user did not pay a fee for the right to engage in the use, the fourth
fair use factor would always favor the copyright holder.‖262
Courts avoid this potential circularity by adopting a number of limiting
principles in relation to the fourth factor. First, the unlikelihood of a derivative market may limit its relevance: ―The market for potential derivative
uses includes only those that creators of original works would in general
develop or license others to develop.‖263 Second, fair use cases often turn
on the simple question of whether the particular market claimed by the
plaintiff is one that is cognizable under copyright. This is not merely a
question for the fourth factor; it permeates consideration of all of the factors. The market harms that courts refuse to recognize illustrate again that
the copyright owner‘s exclusive rights are limited to the communication of
their original expression to the public. This principle is reflected in the
seemingly unrelated cases involving parody and the reverse engineering of
computer software. In both scenarios, courts exclude consideration of market effects that do not arise from expressive substitution.
In Campbell, the Supreme Court quite plainly differentiated the copyright owner‘s general economic interests from the limited protection afforded by copyright:
[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand for the
original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act. Because parody may quite legitimately aim at garroting the original, destroying it
commercially as well as artistically, the role of the courts is to distinguish between biting criticism that merely suppresses demand and copyright infringement, which usurps it.264

Just as Campbell recognizes that criticism is outside of the copyright owner‘s protectable sphere of interest, the reverse engineering cases recognize
that the copyright owner has no protectable interest in preventing the copying of unprotectable expression and ideas buried within its object code.
Courts have consistently held that making unauthorized copies of a computer program, as a necessary step in reverse engineering, is fair use.265 For
262

60 F.3d 913, 929 n.17 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); see also Leval, supra note 215, at 1124
(―By definition every fair use involves some loss of royalty revenue because the secondary user has not
paid royalties.‖).
263
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.
264
Id. at 591–92 (quoting, in part, Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986); BENJAMIN
KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 69 (1967)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
265
See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm‘t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 606 (9th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871 (2000) (holding that Connectix‘s copying of Sony‘s copyrighted basic input–
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example, in Sony v. Connectix, the Ninth Circuit held that although the defendant‘s Virtual Game Station console directly competed with Sony in the
market for platforms capable of playing Sony Playstation games, the Virtual
Game Station was a ―legitimate competitor‖ in that market.266 The court
concluded that Sony‘s desire to control the market for gaming platforms
was understandable, but that ―copyright law . . . does not confer such a monopoly.‖267
Both parody and reverse engineering cases illustrate the exclusion of
market effects that do not arise from expressive substitution. This rationale
is most explicit in the reverse engineering cases. From the beginning of its
decision in Sony v. Connectix, the court emphasized the importance of the
idea–expression distinction: ―We are called upon once again to apply the
principles of copyright law to computers and their software, to determine
what must be protected as expression and what must be made accessible to
the public as function.‖268 Consistent with its decision in Sega Enterprises
v. Accolade, Inc.,269 the Ninth Circuit held in Sony that intermediate copying
of software is fair use if the copying was necessary to gain access to the
functional elements of the software.270 The court based its ruling firmly on
the importance of maintaining the idea–expression distinction: ―We drew
this distinction because the Copyright Act protects expression only, not
ideas or the functional aspects of a software program . . . . Thus, the fair
use doctrine preserves public access to the ideas and functional elements
embedded in copyrighted computer software programs.‖271 As in the parody cases—although for different reasons—the reverse engineering cases exclude consideration of market effects that do not arise from expressive
substitution.
In the case of expressive uses such as parody, and nonexpressive uses
such as reverse engineering, courts have consistently held that the protection that copyright affords is limited to certain cognizable markets. Transoutput system (BIOS) during reverse engineering, used by Connectix to develop a software program that
emulates the functioning of the Sony PlayStation console for regular computers, was fair use); Atari
Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 842–43 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (observing that Atari‘s
reverse engineering of Nintendo‘s 10NES program would have been a fair use of the program, except
that Atari did not possess an authorized copy of the work); Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that Accolade‘s reverse engineering of Sega‘s video game programs
in order to figure out how to make its own games compatible with Sega‘s Genesis system is a fair use);
see also David A. Rice, Copyright and Contract: Preemption After Bowers v. Baystate, 9 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 595, 601 n.19 (2004) (collecting cases). Circumventing encryption for the purpose of reverse engineering is also allowed under the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA. See
17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2006).
266
203 F.3d at 607; see also Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522–23.
267
Sony, 203 F.3d at 607; see also Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523–24.
268
203 F.3d at 598.
269
977 F.2d 1510.
270
Sony, 203 F.3d at 607.
271
Id. at 603 (citing Sega, 997 F.2d 1510).
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formative expressive uses do not usually affect the market in any relevant
sense because the second author‘s expression does not substitute for that of
the original author. The absence of any cognizable market effect is even
more apparent in cases of nonexpressive use because, to the degree that a
particular use is nonexpressive, it has literally no potential substitution effect on a cognizable copyright market.
*

*

*

As established earlier in this Part, the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner typically hinge upon the communication of original expression to the
public. Acts of copying which do not communicate the author‘s original
expression to the public should not generally be held to constitute copyright
infringement. The application of this principle to anomalous copyright subject matter must be considered carefully. Rightly or wrongly, Congress has
extended copyright protection to computer software and architectural plans
in order to provide incentives for the development of these primarily functional objects. As already conceded, while computer programs are treated
as expressive literary works, their expressive elements may be secondary to
the nonprotectable functional output of the program—i.e., what it actually
does. In consequence, the everyday use of a computer program is nonexpressive, but that does not suggest that copyright protection for software
should be effectively dismantled. Instead, courts must exercise caution
when dealing with anomalous copyright subject matter so as not to negate
the very protection Congress intended.
The most appropriate method of doctrinal incorporation of the principle of nonexpressive use is through the fair use doctrine. The role of expressive substitution is not merely compatible with the fair use doctrine; it
is actually necessary to make sense of much existing case law. It may be
unrealistic to attempt to reduce the entirety of fair use jurisprudence into
any one coherent principle. Nonetheless, the general proposition that the
doctrine favors acts of copying that are unlikely to substitute for the copyright owner‘s original expression explains the majority of cases. Like transformative expressive uses, primarily nonexpressive uses should generally
be classified as fair uses because, by their very nature, they do not substitute
for the author‘s original expression. Accordingly, like transformative use,
nonexpressive use should be favored under the first, third, and fourth factors—such uses are nonsubstitutive in ―purpose and character,‖ appropriate
a qualitatively insignificant proportion of the value of the copyright owner‘s
original expression, and produce no cognizable market effect under the
fourth factor.272
272
As is so often the case, the second statutory factor does not appear to have much bite in the context of nonexpressive uses, and thus does little to ―separat[e] the fair use sheep from the infringing
goats.‖ Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
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III. THE DOCTRINAL SIGNIFICANCE OF TRANSACTION COSTS
Copyright disputes involving copy-reliant technology may be completely resolved once a court determines that the use in question is nonexpressive. However, there are nonetheless two reasons for delving further
into the issues of transaction costs and opt-outs that preoccupy this final
Part. First, opt-outs are a common feature of copy-reliant technology and
their ubiquity deserves some explanation. Second, although the correct application of the nonexpressive use principle expounded in this Article will
be clear in many cases, it may not be clear-cut in every case. In those cases
where ambiguity persists, courts will have to consider the totality of the defendant‘s fair use claim. In that context, the defendant‘s opt-out mechanism
takes on considerable significance. Section A begins with an explanation of
why copy-reliant technologies face significant transaction costs problems
and the role of opt-out mechanisms in reducing those transaction costs.
Section B discusses the relationship between transaction costs and the form
and content of property rights generally. Section C then specifically addresses how and why the use of opt-outs by copy-reliant technologies is relevant to a fair use analysis.
A. Transaction Costs and Copy-Reliant Technologies
The transaction costs faced by copy-reliant technologies are different
in kind and in magnitude to those pertaining to analog works. Often, the
sheer number of transactions that must typically be accommodated by copyreliant technologies makes the transaction costs problems they face unique.
The irony of copy-reliant technology is that, while technology has helped
reduce the per unit transaction cost in relation to some discrete objects, such
as motion pictures and sound recordings, the proliferation of copyrighted
content means that total transaction costs for any technology that must cover the whole of the Internet have increased dramatically. While private ordering through collective rights management may be a common solution in
various fields of intellectual property, it does not necessarily offer a solution in the context of copy-reliant technologies due to the scale, decentralization, and heterogeneity of the Internet.
Nonetheless, Internet
entrepreneurs have found other ways to address transaction costs, primarily
through the combination of well understood default rules and technologically enabled opt-out mechanisms. These issues are now addressed in detail.
1. Scale, Diversity, and Decentralization.—The sheer scale of the Internet is truly daunting. No technology since the printing press has given
rise to a proliferation of copyrighted works equivalent to the explosion of
Internet content witnessed since the mid-1990s. A simple comparison helps
illustrate this point. The U.S. Library of Congress is the world‘s largest library, with more than 134 million books, photographs, maps, musical
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works, manuscripts, and other printed materials.273 The volume of material
available on the Internet has dwarfed this number in a very short period.
There are now an estimated 1.7 billion Internet users worldwide.274 It is difficult to estimate the number of web pages available on the world wide web
at any given time; however, the Internet Archive—which is only a partial
collection—contains 85 billion searchable pages archived from 1996 to the
present.275 This number alone exceeds the entire collection of the Library of
Congress by a ratio of more than 600 to 1.
The volume of material on the Internet presents a significant transaction cost problem for Internet search technology in particular because the
value of any search engine grows exponentially with its coverage. The
Google Book project and plagiarism detection software confront a similar
network effect. The difference between the requirements of copy-reliant
technologies and other more traditional consumers of copyrighted works is
illustrated by the contrast between an Internet search engine and a book
publisher. To provide a useful product, a book publisher must sift through a
large number of submitted manuscripts, select one, and negotiate a license
with the author. The publisher is fortunate that once she finds one good
manuscript, there is no need to read the remainder. Furthermore, if the publisher‘s preferred author is intransigent in negotiations, she can proceed to
her second best alternative at very little sacrifice. In contrast, an Internet
search engine cannot just select one or two websites under each search term
and rest on its laurels. First, search engines must be able to cope with unexpected queries. Second, search engines are subject to a significant network effect such that they are only really useful at a threshold of near
complete coverage.
The Internet has not only expanded information production, but has
radically decentralized it as well. The Gartner consulting firm estimates
that around 100 million writers actively maintained a personal website or
blog in 2007.276 Even as the mainstream press continues to consolidate into
fewer and fewer media empires, the Internet has decentralized news production and increased both its volume and its diversity.277 Not only are these
273

See The Library of Congress, About the Library, http://www.loc.gov/about/facts.html (last visited July 29, 2009). Fewer then 32 million of these items are books. Id.
274
Internet
World
Stats,
World
Internet
Usage
and
Population
Statistics,
http://www.Internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
275
The Internet Archive is a nonprofit organization founded to build an Internet library, with the
purpose of offering permanent access for researchers, historians, and scholars to historical collections
that exist in digital format. The Internet Archive, About the Internet Archive, http://www.archive.org/
about/about.php (last visited June 22, 2009).
276
Antony Savvas, Gartner‘s Top 10 Forecasts for 2007 and Beyond, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM,
Dec. 15, 2006, available at http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2006/12/15/220726/gartners-top10-forecasts-for-2007-and-beyond.htm.
277
See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 223 (2006); see also Brett M. Frischmann, Cultural Environmentalism and
The Wealth of Networks, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083 (2007).
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actors decentralized, they are also diverse.278 The ―new media‖ and distributed production exemplified by blogs and social networking sites are characterized by (1) a blurring of the lines between producers and consumers,
(2) a significant degree of interaction between participants who are both
producers and consumers, and (3) low monetary costs, at least for the majority of participants.279 As a result, the Internet has complicated the economics of copyright by expanding the range of viable information
production strategies. The proliferation of content producers and their heterogeneity is no doubt beneficial, but it presents copy-reliant technologies
with a difficult set of transaction cost problems if they intend to clear rights
before unleashing their automated processes.
The high transaction cost environment is not limited to Internet search
engines. Plagiarism detection software, which must search the whole Internet for possible sources of plagiarism, faces a similar problem of scale. The
transaction cost issues in Google Book are similar, but distinct. Google
faces substantial costs in building out its database of library books. There
are approximately 18 million books in the combined collections of
Google‘s partner libraries, and each one of these needs to be pulled off a
shelf, scanned, and reshelved.280 The average cost of scanning each book is
estimated at around $10.281 In addition to these costs, if Google‘s intermediate copying is not fair use, it will also be confronted with a substantial
rights clearance problem.282 For each book Google will have to (1) determine whether the book is in the public domain, (2) determine the identity of
the copyright owner(s), (3) locate the copyright owner(s), and (4) negotiate
to obtain the permission of the owner(s).
Google‘s clearance costs will vary according to the book in question:
broadly speaking, they will be lowest for very old works (pre-1923), modest
for very new works (2001 onwards), and highest for those in between (1923
to 2000).283 The clearance costs for very old and very new works are quite
278

See generally BENKLER, supra note 277 (describing information production in a networked information economy and its inclusion of a broader range of participants).
279
Id. at 91–132.
280
Brian Lavoie, Lynn Silipigni Connaway & Lorcan Dempsey, Anatomy of Aggregate Collections:
The Example of Google Print for Libraries, 11(9) D-LIB MAG., Sept. 2005, available at
http://www.dlib.org/dlib/september05/lavoie/09lavoie.html.
281
See, e.g., Carolyn Said, Revolutionary Chapter; Google‘s Ambitious Book-Scanning Plan Seen
As Key Shift In Paper-Based Culture, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 20, 2004, at F1. (―[P]ress reports have pegged
it at about $10 per book.‖); see also Eleanor Yang Su, Google Will Post UC Library Books Online For
Public, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug.10, 2006, at A4 (reporting that the University of California estimates that it would cost it $30 to $40 per book to scan its collection).
282
Google‘s recent class settlement with The Authors Guild, Inc., the Association of American
Publishers, Inc., and the broad class of authors and publishers they represent effectively resolves the
rights clearance issue for Google Book, as with respect to U.S. copyright interests. A draft of the proposed Settlement Agreement is available at http://books.google.com/booksrightsholders/agreementcontents.html.
283
The significance of each of these dates is explained below.
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low. If a work was published in the United States before January 1, 1923, it
is safe to assume that is in the public domain.284 The clearance costs for
very new works are also quite low because publishers now insist on obtaining the relevant rights from authors and are in a position to grant Google
permission to include these works in its database.285 Recall Tasini, where
the Supreme Court held in favor of freelance journalists in relation to the
inclusion and display of their articles in online databases.286 Rather than
providing the freelance authors who it had already paid once for their articles with a new stream of revenue, the Times Company and other publishers simply removed most of the freelance pieces from their online
databases. Since Tasini, it has become industry practice to insist on very
broad rights in relation to electronic storage and retrieval.287
However, for the vast numbers of books published between 1923 and
2001, the applicable clearance costs are likely to be quite high.288 First, although it may not be obvious from the date of publication alone, many of
these works are in fact in the public domain. The duration of copyright under the 1909 Act was limited to twenty-eight years, plus a renewal period of
twenty-eight years.289 This renewal period was subsequently extended to
forty-seven years, and then again to sixty-seven years.290 The result is that
if a work was published in the United States before 1963 and not renewed,
it is in the public domain.291 The Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 made renewal automatic for works first copyrighted between January 1, 1964, and
December 31, 1977.292 Likewise, certain works may also be in the public
284

Note that a work created but not published prior to 1978 may not be in the public domain. See
generally Elizabeth Townsend Gard, January 1, 2003: The Birth of the Unpublished Public Domain and
Its International Implications, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 687 (2006); R. Anthony Reese, Public but
Private: Copyright‘s New Unpublished Public Domain, 85 TEX. L. REV. 585 (2007).
285
Google and Amazon.com have each established cooperative agreements with publishers that allow them to display considerable portions of books in a searchable database. See Google, Google Books
Partner Program, http://books.google.com/support/partner/bin/answer.py?answer=106167 (last visited
July 1, 2009); Amazon.com, Search Inside! Participation Agreement, http://www.amazon.com/ gp/htmlforms-controller/SITB_Publisher_Signup_Form (last visited July 1, 2009).
286
See supra Part II.A.2; N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
287
See Amy Terry, Tasini Aftermath: The Consequences of the Freelancers‘ Victory, 14 DEPAULLCA J. ART & ENT. L. 231, 238–39 (2004).
288
See Elizabeth Townsend Gard, Vera Brittain, Section 104(a) and Section 104A: A Case Study in
Sorting Out Duration of Foreign Works Under the 1976 Copyright Act 11 (Tulane Public Law Research
Paper No. 07-09, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015575.
289
1909 Act, §§ 23–24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080–81.
290
17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1992) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §304(a) (2006)).
291
Thanks to the combined efforts of Carnegie Mellon Universal Library Project, Project Gutenberg, Distributed Proofreaders, and a Google software engineer named Jarkko Hietaniemi, the paperbased renewal record maintained by the U.S. Copyright Office can now be searched electronically. See
Jon Orwant, U.S. Copyright Renewal Records Available for Download, INSIDE GOOGLE BOOKS, June
23, 2008, http://booksearch.blogspot.com/2008/06/us-copyright-renewal-records-available.html.
292
Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 304
(2006)).
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domain because they were published in the United States without the appropriate copyright notice.293 However, the notice requirement only applies
to works first published before March 1, 1989.294 Additionally, notice defects will not affect a work‘s copyright status if the defective copy was published without the authorization of the copyright owner or the notice defect
only applied to a small number of copies.295 Furthermore, in some circumstances it is possible for the author to correct a notice defect.296 It is important to note that any work created by a U.S. government employee or officer
also belongs to the public domain, provided that the person created the
work in her official capacity.297 The status of unpublished works and the
works of foreigners adds several additional layers of complexity, including
the possibility that some works may have been removed from the public
domain by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994.298
Second, even if a work remains subject to copyright, the ownership of
those rights can be highly uncertain. The basic principle of copyright law is
that copyright vests initially in the author or authors of the work.299 However, those rights may be assigned in an infinite chain of transactions, bankruptcies, and inheritances. These laws are by no means uniform. The
disposition to copyright ownership through a will or intestacy is determined
by the domicile of the author,300 even if that domicile is in a foreign country.301 Furthermore, unvested renewal rights under the 1909 Copyright Act
and rights of termination under the 1976 Copyright Act pass according to
complex statutory provisions, which may, or may not, mirror the author‘s
293

In this regard, the requirement for copyright notice functions as an opt-in. See Christopher
Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 487 (2004) (discussing the role of copyright formalities in ―facilitat[ing] licensing by lowering the cost of identifying rightsholders‖).
294
17 U.S.C. §§ 401–02 (1976) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 401–02 (2006)) (prior to the Berne
Convention Implementation Act). Note that whether a work was in fact ―published‖ turns on a number
of factual questions. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.04 for a general discussion.
295
Communication ―to a definitely selected group, and for a limited purpose, without the right of
diffusion, reproduction, distribution or sale . . .‖ without a copyright notice does not inject a work into
the public domain. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Applied Innovations, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 698, 710
(D. Minn. 1987), aff‘d, 876 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.13[A]). Publication can be especially ambiguous for copies of letters deposited with a library.
296
17 U.S.C. § 405 (1976) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 405 (2006)) (prior to the Berne Convention Implementation Act).
297
See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006).
298
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 restores copyright protection to certain foreign
works which had fallen into the public domain due to failure to comply with formalities, but which
would otherwise now be eligible for protection in the United States. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3)(A)(i)
(2006).
299
17 U.S.C. § 201(a). This is subject to the work for hire doctrine and the possibility of joint authorship. Id. at § 201(b), (c).
300
17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1).
301
Brecht v. Bentley, 185 F. Supp. 890, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (―It by no means follows that because
a proprietor under American Copyright Law is given no rights against an infringing foreign publication
that his rights of ownership may not descend by the law of a foreign domicile.‖).
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will or the default positions of her domicile.302 Beyond the name of the initial author, the work discloses almost none of the facts relevant to determining the current ownership of copyright. The records of the U.S. Copyright
Office also fail to contain the necessary information. As the work ages, the
complexity of these legal and factual issues multiplies exponentially.
Third, Google faces significant costs related to opportunism and strategic behavior. As discussed in more detail below, even authors who favor
inclusion in the Google Book database may have an incentive to hold out
for higher payment if their copyright gives them an effective veto over the
project.303
How significant are these costs likely to be? There are an estimated 18
million books in the combined collections of the libraries participating in
the Google Book project. Approximately 10.5 million of these books are
unique—they are only held by one of the participating libraries.304 It is estimated that slightly less than 20% of these works were published before
1923 and thus likely present no copyright issues.305 That leaves about 8.4
million books with some potential copyright constraint. Even if the average
clearance cost (the cost of determining the status of the book, finding the relevant copyright owners, and negotiating a license) were as little as $200,
the total cost of rights clearance before any royalties have been paid would
be over a billion dollars. It is easy to imagine that clearance costs could be
in the thousands, not merely the hundreds, in which case the total cost of
proactively clearing rights on every book could exceed $10 billion. This
does not include any royalties paid to authors. As these very preliminary
estimates show, the problem of high transaction costs is common to most
copy-reliant technologies and is not limited to Internet search engines.
2. Technology Reduces Some Transaction Costs While Increasing
Others.—Advances in technology have reduced transaction costs in many
areas by reducing the cost of communication and increasing the effectiveness of searching. Such advances, however, have done little to offset the
significant transaction costs problems faced by copy-reliant technologies.
Commentators have been predicting the death of fair use on the Internet
since the late 1990s. Specifically, the prediction was that digital rights
management technology (DRM) would allow copyright owners to automatically enforce their rights and to prevent uses that were once considered
fair.306 Those who embraced the death of fair use online argued that DRM
302

See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a); see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 209, 221 (1990) (holding that
even if an author has assigned renewal rights, ―the assignee holds nothing if the author dies before the
commencement of the renewal period‖).
303
See infra note 383 and accompanying text.
304
Lavoie, Connaway & Dempsey, supra note 280.
305
Id.
306
See generally Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management
Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41 (2001). DRM refers to access control technologies that limit the use
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would allow copyright owners to define the permissions associated with
their works and make it possible to charge different prices to different users,
thus reducing the need for fair use.307 Those who feared the death of fair
use made the same prediction, arguing that that the control facilitated by
DRM would enable an end run around the public policy values embedded
in copyright law.308
Those predictions have proven to be extravagant. DRM permission
systems have had a muted impact on DVDs and digital music, and no impact whatsoever on the majority of transactions relevant to copy-reliant
technologies. The effect of DRM in the context of DVDs and digital music
has been muted because permissions systems are fragile and hard to maintain for at least two reasons. First, once the encryption on any one copy of
a work is broken, that copy can be used to propagate an infinite number of
unencrypted copies. Second, users tend to gravitate toward unrestricted
formats precisely because they offer fewer restrictions.309 The network effects of this preference for unrestricted formats mean that content providers
are only in a position to impose permission systems if they are able to control both the content format and the playback technology. Content providers have been partially successful in developing permissions systems with
respect to DVDs, but similar attempts with respect to audio CDs have been

of digital media or devices. See INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 177–200 (1995).
307
See Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in a Changing World, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y U.S.A. 133, 137
(2003) (―For the great bulk of uses previously excused because of transaction costs, the [fair use] doctrine will simply become irrelevant.‖); see also Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of
Automated Rights Management on Copyright‘s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 580–84 (1998)
(same); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 233
(same); Edmund W. Kitch, Can the Internet Shrink Fair Use?, 78 NEB. L. REV. 880, 881 (1999) (same);
Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the ―Newtonian‖ World of OnLine Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 130–32 (1997) (same). See also Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC‘Y U.S.A. 1, 15 (1997) (―[T]he primary justification
for exempting private copying as fair use has been transaction costs, but these are much attenuated in the
digital world.‖).
308
See Burk & Cohen, supra note 306; see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 814
(2001).
309
Both Apple and Amazon have adopted this strategy. See Press Release, Apple.com, Apple Unveils Higher Quality DRM-Free Music on the iTunes Store, (Apr. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/04/02itunes.html; Evan Blass, Amazon Announces DRM-Free
MP3 Music Store, ENGADGET, May 16, 2007, http://www.engadget.com/2007/05/16/amazonannounces-drm-free-mp3-music-store. Note also that consumers may distrust DRM because of a potential lack of backwards compatibility. For example, music bought from Microsoft‘s MSN music which
uses ―plays4sure‖ DRM cannot play on the Microsoft Zune digital media player. See Seán Byrne, Microsoft Postpones MSN Music DRM Server Shut-Off, CDFREAKS.COM, June, 19, 2008,
http://www.myce.com/news/Microsoft-postpones-MSN-Music-DRM-server-shut-off-14762.
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somewhat disastrous.310 To the extent that copyright owners have had any
success with DRM, these successes look more like ―sufficient‖ control
within the traditional contours of copyright law, not the Orwellian vision of
a digital lockdown predicted over a decade ago.311
DVDs and digital music notwithstanding, advances in the technological protection of content have been overwhelmed by advances in the technologies of reproduction and distribution. The proliferation of easy-to-copy
content on the Internet has actually increased the economic significance of
transaction costs. The dominant transaction costs problem on the Internet
relates to negotiating basic permissions for billions of pages, not sophisticated bargaining over relatively few high volume items such as popular
movies, books, and music. Thus, while DRM technology may have the potential to reduce transaction costs with respect to any one individual preexisting work, the magnitude of transactions that copy-reliant technologies
must process has increased exponentially. So, ironically, while Internet
search engines have reduced transaction costs in relation to many copyrighted markets, they themselves are subject to increasing transaction costs
by virtue of their own success.
The premillennial consensus that technology would reduce the significance of transaction costs in relation to copyright failed to take into account the difference between the costs attending any one transaction and the
total volume of transaction costs faced by copy-reliant technologies. The
adoption of new technologies has reduced the former, but not the latter.
3. Collective Rights Management and Copy-Reliant Technologies.—
Collective management is the exercise of copyright and related rights by
organizations acting on behalf of the owners of rights.312 In many intellectual property contexts, transaction costs problems are addressed through
collective rights management in the form of collection societies such as the
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), or pa-

310

See Megan M. LaBelle, The ―Rootkit Debacle‖: The Latest Chapter in the Story of the Recording Industry and the War on Music Piracy, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 79, 81 (discussing consumer class action lawsuits and law enforcement proceedings against Sony resulting from an attempt to prevent audio
CD copying by consumers); J. Alex Halderman & Edward W. Felten, Lessons from the Sony CD DRM
Episode, 15 USENIX SECURITY SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS 77 (2006), available at
http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/pub/sonydrm-ext.pdf; see generally R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to
Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1015–16
(2003) (arguing that there are very good reasons to doubt the meaningful impact of DRM anytime soon).
311
See Jane C. Ginsburg, The Pros and Cons of Strengthening Intellectual Property Protection:
Technological Protection Measures and Section 1201 of the U.S. Copyright Act 24 (Columbia Pub. Law
Research Paper No. 07-137, 2007) (―To date, ‗digital lock-up‘ persists in spectral guise, a grim, yet untranspired, anticipation.‖).
312
See World Intellectual Property Organization, About WIPO, Collective Management of Copyright and Related Right, http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/about_collective_mngt.html#P46_4989 (last
visited Apr. 12, 2009).

1664

103:1607 (2009)

Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology

tent pools and joint ventures, such as the 3G Patent Platform Partnership.313
The success of collective rights management in some fields demonstrates
that market based solutions can overcome high transaction costs in situations where the individual management of rights is impossible or impractical.314 However, this particular type of private ordering solution may not be
effective in relation to copy-reliant technologies because of the scale of
transactions required and the decentralization and diversity of the relevant
rights holders.
The problem with collective rights management is that it has been most
successful in the context of homogeneous transactions among repeat players
with similar preferences.315 Collective rights management is unlikely to reduce the transaction costs faced by copy-reliant technologies. First, copyreliant technologies typically rely on close to complete coverage—a search
engine that only covers half the Internet is of very limited use. This means
that each html page is a complementary good, whereas collective rights organizations like ASCAP typically license a range of potential substitutes.
Second, collective rights organizations like ASCAP only work because a
significant percentage of relevant copyright owners affirmatively opt into
that system. Given the billions of works at issue and the hundreds of millions of rights owners involved, similar levels of participation seem unlikely, at least for search engines. On the other hand, it is actually somewhat
surprising that high schools and universities have not established a centralized body to facilitate plagiarism detection. These institutions have a great
interest in advancing plagiarism software and could easily make participation in an antiplagiarism database a condition of entry. In this and other
areas, even where the perquisites for effective collective rights management
appear to exist, rights holders and the relevant intermediaries have been
slow to take advantage of the potential savings collective action offers.316
313

3G Patent Platform Partnership is a standard setting organization designed to cap total fees paid
to patentees that own rights in the 3G mobile phone standard. See generally Reiko Aoki and Aaron
Schiff, Promoting Access to Intellectual Property: Patent Pools, Copyright Collectives and Clearinghouses. 38(2) R&D MANAGEMENT 189–204 (2008) (reviewing and comparing patent pools, intellectual
property clearinghouses, and copyright collectives as alternative systems for promoting efficient access
to licensable intellectual property).
314
Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective
Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1293–94 (1996). But note that the continuing court supervision of ASCAP pursuant to an antitrust decree indicates that it is not the best example of a purely private market solution. See United States v. Am. Soc‘y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, No.
Civ.A. 42-245, 1950 WL 42273, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1950).
315
Id. at 1319 (―Only repeated transactions among right holders will give rise to the private institutions discussed . . . . One-shot or sporadic interactions do not justify investments in exchange institutions.‖).
316
See WILLIAM W. FISHER & WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, THE DIGITAL LEARNING CHALLENGE:
OBSTACLES TO EDUCATIONAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL IN THE DIGITAL AGE 80 (2006) (noting that there is a greater reluctance by rights holders regarding licensed digital uses of content as opposed to analog uses such as photocopies).

1665

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4. Private Ordering Through Opt-Outs.—It has been established thus
far that transaction costs present a formidable potential obstacle to copyreliant technologies, one that is unlikely to be overcome by either DRM
technology or collective rights management. How then do copy-reliant
technologies continue to function? The answer is that copy-reliant technologies typically rely on a combination of well understood default rules and
technologically enabled opt-out mechanisms to reduce transaction costs.
Grasping how these opt-out mechanisms work requires some (but not
too much) understanding of the basic structure of the Internet. The Internet
is an open system that allows any endpoint (usually a computer) to communicate with any other endpoint through a set of standard protocols.317 The
architecture of the Internet thus embeds a default rule of unrestricted access.
This default requires anyone who does not wish their material to be available to affirmatively opt out. For example, website owners remain free to restrict access by blocking specific IP addresses, or by requiring a user
account, a password, or both. They can also control how search engines interact with their copyrighted material by employing a technological device
known as the Robots Exclusion Protocol.318 The default is, however, an
open system.
The Internet norm of open access stands in marked contrast to the
usual assumptions made with respect to copyrighted works. This norm has
remained stable for some time for three reasons. First, the initial design of
the Internet and its basic protocol for the exchange of information embedded an open architecture.319 The open, minimalist, and neutral design of
TCP/IP has enabled an unparalleled diversity of social and technological
innovations.320 Open systems and end-to-end architecture were fundamental
early Internet technical standards. The default of open access therefore continues, in part, simply as a result of path dependence. Second, the norm of
openness also continues to flourish because it reflects the preferences of the
majority of Internet users. Most people want their websites seen and their
emails received. Third, those with minority preferences generally have no
quarrel with the default of open access; they simply opt out of the default as
it suits them.
317

JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS
WORLD 23 (2006).
318
See infra notes 320–324 and accompanying text.
319
See Vinton G. Cerf & Robert E. Kahn, A Protocol for Packet Network Intercommunication,
22(5) IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMM. 637, 637–48 (1974), available at http://www.
cs.princeton.edu/courses/archive/fall06/cos561/papers/cerf74.pdf (the original specification of the
―Transmission Control Protocol‖); CHRISTOS J. P. MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., HISTORY OF THE INTERNET: A
CHRONOLOGY, 1843 TO THE PRESENT 80–82 (1999) (an excerpt from a 1974 paper discussing the architecture of the Internet); GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 317, at 23.
320
TCP/IP stands for Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol. Together, these two networking protocols largely control the movement of data across the Internet. See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 317, at 22–24.
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This third point requires some elaboration. Those with minority preferences can easily opt out of the default rules that govern the Internet in a
number of ways, the most significant of which is probably the Robots Exclusion Protocol.321 The Robots Exclusion Protocol is particularly significant in the context of copy-reliant technology. Every major Internet search
engine relies on the Robots Exclusion Protocol to prevent their automated
agents from indexing certain content and to remove previously indexed material from their databases as required. Although it has been widely
adopted, the Robots Exclusion Protocol is not controlled by any standards
setting organization and thus remains a de facto standard. The success of
the Robots Exclusion Protocol is attributable to two factors: its low cost and
high degree of customization. The monetary cost of using the Robots Exclusion Protocol is zero and the information costs are not significantly higher. Adding a robots.txt file to a website is trivial and there are a number of
widely available free tools for automatically generating a robots.txt file.322
To disallow all robots from a website simply requires two lines of code:
User–Agent: *
Disallow: /

Adding these instructions to the robots.txt file at the root level of a
website323 will block all compliant search engine robots and other information harvesting software agents.324 As explained in section C below, software architects who deliberately disregard the instructions contained in a
robots.txt file and thus do not facilitate an opt-out regime will be less able
to rely on a fair use defense than those who do.
Apart from its low cost and relative simplicity, the real attraction of the
Robots Exclusion Protocol is its extraordinary flexibility. To block a particular directory rather than the entire site requires simply changing the
second line to include the name of the directory.325 The Google search engine, for example, is designed to allow site owners to prevent individual
321

In this context, a ―robot‖ is synonymous with a web crawler. For a general discussion of the
Robots Exclusion Protocol, see DAVID GOURLEY & BRIAN TOTTY, HTTP: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE 225–
241 (2002).
See also The Web Robots Pages, About /robots.txt In a Nutshell,
http://www.robotstxt.org/robotstxt.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2009). The original Robots Exclusion Protocol was set out in 1994 by Martijn Koster. See Martijn Koster, A Standard for Robot Exclusion
(1994), available at http://www.robotstxt.org/orig.html.
322
The Web Robots Pages provides a tutorial on creating robots.txt files with a text editor. See
http://www.robotstxt.org. Google offers a free robots.txt generator as part of their webmaster tools at
http://www.google.com/support/webmasters/bin/answer.py?answer=83098&topic=13648. Microsoft‘s
―How to Write a Robots.txt File‖ Knowledgebase article is available at http://support.microsoft.com/kb/
217103. Other websites that provide additional tools include http://robots.googletoad.com/ and
http://www.seochat.com/seo-tools/robots-generator/.
323
For example: ―http://www.example.com/robots.txt.‖
324
See TARA CALISHAIN & RAEL DORNFEST, GOOGLE HACKS: 100 INDUSTRIAL-STRENGTH TIPS &
TOOLS 309 (2003); THOMAS A. POWELL, WEB DESIGN: THE COMPLETE REFERENCE 247–49 (2000).
325
For example: ―Disallow: /nameofdirectory/.‖
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pages, sections of a website, or an entire website from being indexed.326 In
the event that a website owner changes its preferences by activating the robots exclusion standard after Google has already indexed the content, the
Google search engine will remove this content the next time Google
―crawls‖ it.327 Google‘s implementation of the Robots Exclusion Protocol is
also highly customizable: among other things, site owners can also remove
either or both of the snippets and images that appear in the search results.328
The important thing to realize about opt-out mechanisms such as the
Robots Exclusion Protocol is that they do not displace private ordering—
they are the means of private ordering. When transaction costs are otherwise high, opt-out mechanisms can play a critical role in preserving a default rule of open access while still allowing individuals to have their
preferences respected. In the context of search engine technology, opt-out
mechanisms such as the Robots Exclusion Protocol have reduced seemingly
insurmountable transaction costs and made them manageable, if not trivial.329 The Robots Exclusion Protocol and similar opt-outs do not actually
clear rights in the sense of negotiating licenses, but they substitute for rights
clearance where copyright owners would price access at zero—those who
are not content with a zero price still retain the option to negotiate for something more than the default. Field, Perfect 10, and Google Book are interesting partly because the plaintiffs in those cases chose to object to the
default rule instead of simply opting out.330
B. Transaction Costs and Property Rights
Critics of various copy-reliant technologies are quick to invoke the rhetoric of property in service of their claims. Former Authors Guild president
Nick Taylor is illustrative: he argues that Google is ―in effect, stealing
people‘s property and providing others with access to it for its own gain.‖331
The rallying cry of property rights here is more rhetorically than analytically useful. When a new office building casts a shadow over a hotel swimming pool or obstructs the air current so as to impede the operation of a
windmill, it is pointless for the affected parties to simply proclaim their

326
See CALISHAIN & DORNFEST, supra note 324, at 315; Google, Removing My Own Content
From Google's Index, http://www.google.com/support/webmasters/bin/answer.py?answer=35301&topic
=8459 (last visited July 29, 2009).
327
Google, supra note 326.
328
Id.
329
See John S. Sieman, Using the Implied License to Inject Common Sense into Digital Copyright,
85 N.C. L. REV. 885, 891 (2007) (―The transaction costs in getting permission before viewing every
website would be so high that people would be likely to stop visiting websites. An opt-in Internet would
be virtually unusable.‖).
330
The motivations for this discontent are explored further in Part III.C.2, infra.
331
Nick Taylor, Letter from the President—Q4 2005, AUTHORS GUILD BULLETIN, Fall 2005, available at http://www.european-writers-congress.org/upload/312006102637.pdf at 14.
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property rights are sacrosanct.332 The owners of the office building and the
windmill each have property rights: the real question is what exactly is the
content of those rights? Whose rights prevail when owners assert conflicting claims? Both the doctrinal and welfare economics answers to this question must be resolved with reference to transaction costs. This section
briefly summarizes some of the significant literature on transaction costs
and explains why the mere assertion of ―property rights‖ does very little to
tell us whether the rights of a copyright owner include the right not to allow
copy-reliant technology to interact with her work.
Transaction costs are central to an economic understanding of property
rights because they dictate both the scope and the form of private rights.
Private property generally reduces transaction costs by lowering the costs of
coordination among disparate individuals. Secure property rights are generally thought to be essential for the increased specialization that sustains
economic development because they provide the institutional framework
needed for long term and complex relationships.333 The allocation and definition of property rights determines both which individuals have the authority to decide how a specific resource is used and to whom the costs and
benefits of that use will flow.334 As every student of the Coase Theorem
knows, in a world without transaction costs, the specific allocation of these
costs and benefits is unimportant because all the relevant parties will bargain to an efficient outcome regardless of their initial entitlement.335 However, as every student of the Coase Theorem also knows, in the real world,
reallocation and enforcement are costly and many transaction costs persist.
Indeed, because the specification of rights is itself a costly endeavor, it is
axiomatic that rights will never be fully specified.336
How then should property rights be allocated given that transaction
costs abound? One view is that, given transaction costs stand in the way of
efficient reallocation, the primary objective of the law should be to reduce
transaction costs by defining simple and clear property rights that enable
private exchange.337 On this view, the law should not devote considerable
resources to optimizing initial allocation; it should just ensure that all the
rights worth specifying are allocated.338 A second view is that, because substantial transaction costs persist even after private rights have been allo332

These examples come from R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1960).
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
33–35 (1990). Property rights are but one element of the institutional matrix that sustains the rule of
law.
334
NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO
POSTMODERNISM AND BEYOND 249 (2d ed. 2006).
335
Coase, supra note 332.
336
NORTH, supra note 333.
337
ROBERT COOTER & TOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 97 (4th ed. 2004).
338
See id. (―By lubricating bargaining, the law enables the private parties to exchange legal rights,
thus relieving lawmakers of the difficult task of allocating legal rights efficiently.‖).
333
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cated, lawmakers should allocate property rights to their best initial use so
as to minimize the harm caused by inevitable failures to reach private
agreements.339
These contending implications of the Coase Theorem are frequently offered as a binary choice. Because the applicability of either depends on the
exact nature of the transaction costs at issue, however, courts should accept
neither prescription as dogma. In fact, just as the decision of a firm to either make or buy is determined by relative transaction costs, so too is the
structure of property rights.340 In this context, it should be noted that the
form that property rights take can play a significant role in reducing or exacerbating transaction costs. There is in consequence a vast legal literature
devoted to understanding various features of different types of property as
either attempts to perfect the initial allocation of rights or, more commonly,
to reduce the transaction costs associated with those rights.341
In contrast to contractual rights that bind only the parties to an agreement, property creates rights against the whole world. Thus, as Thomas
Merrill and Henry Smith have argued, property rights attached to a ―thing‖
impose ―an informational burden‖ on all those who are likely to interact
with that ―thing.‖342 Merrill and Smith argue further that the broad application of the informational burden of property rights explains the tendency of
these rights to come in a fixed menu of forms. Thus, the law reduces transaction costs by limiting property rights to a set of standardized packages
that the layperson can understand at low cost.343
Consideration of information costs suggests a possible divergence between property in tangible and intangible objects—whereas physical proximity limits the informational burden of tangible property, those same
burdens can multiply almost infinitely in the case of intellectual property.
Only those walking past Blackacre need to worry where its boundaries are;
every musician in the world needs to worry that their new composition
might have been inadvertently copied from any one of thousands of pop

339

See id. at 97–98 (discussing this theory as the ―Normative Hobbes Theorem‖).
See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (observing that
differences in transaction costs explain variation in organizational hierarchy).
341
The classic work in this area being Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (discussing the implications of transaction costs for different remedial structures).
342
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?,
111 YALE L.J. 357, 358–59 (2001); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001) (explaining property and contract law in terms of
the information costs of in rem and in personam rights); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3–9 (2000)
(arguing that the standardized forms of property reduce transaction costs).
343
See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 342.
340
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songs their brains have absorbed over the years.344 Another difference is also worth noting: physical objects suggest at least a core definition congruent with their physical attributes, whereas property rights in intangibles are
purely a legal construct.345 In other words, while the rights attached to real
property and chattels might be fuzzy at the edges, the ambiguity of rights
attached to intangible expression is usually more pronounced.346 Accordingly, the definition of intellectual property rights must be even more sensitive to transaction costs—not just those between willing parties, but those
imposed on the rest of the world.347
Numerous legal commentators have offered transaction cost and information cost explanations for specific attributes of intellectual property
law. In The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, William
Landes and Richard Posner explain a diverse range of intellectual property
doctrines as efficient responses to transaction costs problems. With respect
to copyright, they argue that the need to keep transaction costs low explains
the idea–expression distinction, the limited duration copyright, and the derivative work right.348 In a more explicitly comparative vein, Clarisa Long
argues that many differences between patent and copyright law stem from
divergences in the information costs and coordination problems associated
with expressive works and inventions.349 In a recent article, Henry Smith
also applies information-cost theory to explain certain differences between
copyright and patent law, arguing that the former is more like tort and the
latter more like property.350
Transaction costs are not only important in establishing certain features
of copyright doctrine, an assessment of transaction costs is also a key internal feature of specific copyright doctrines, most notably fair use. The cen344

In one noteworthy case, George Harrison was found to have ―subconsciously plagiarized‖ the
1963 hit He‘s So Fine in his 1970 single, My Sweet Lord. See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs
Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The alleged similarities escape this author.
345
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 16 (2003) (noting that transaction costs tend to be higher in intellectual
property as it is frequently difficult to identify such property because by definition it has no unique
physical site).
346
As much was acknowledged by Judge Learned Hand when he said that ―as soon as literal appropriation ceases to be the test [for copyright infringement], the whole matter is necessarily at large.‖ Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
347
See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 345, at 21 (concluding that intellectual property rights tend
to be more costly than rights in physical property).
348
Id. at 21, 92–93, 111.
349
Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465 (2004).
350
Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information,
116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007); see also Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO
ST. L.J. 473 (2005) (justifying patent law based on private transaction costs savings rather than the more
conventional incentive-based rationale); Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783 (2007) (making a transaction cost argument against
the imposition of injunctions in cases where courts cannot easily tailor injunctions to forbid only the
prohibited conduct).
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tral purpose of the fair use doctrine is to permit certain uses that would otherwise be infringing. Indeed, as Wendy Gordon has shown, the presence of
high transaction costs and other market failures provides a useful framework for understanding the entirety of the fair use doctrine.351 Fair use
plays a critical role where copyright owners attempt to use their rights to
stifle criticism or prevent the articulation of contrary viewpoints.352 However, the doctrine is not limited to facilitating criticism and social debate.
Fair use is necessary even when copyright owners are purely commercially
motivated because licensing and other private ordering mechanisms do not
provide a solution for cases involving high exchange costs, high information costs, and strategic behavior. As the market failure paradigm demonstrates, the fair use doctrine is particularly important in situations where the
costs of obtaining permission outweigh the benefits of the use. Thus, according to at least one court, the fair use doctrine protects book reviews because in the absence of a fair use doctrine, most publishers would disclaim
control over the contents of reviews in any event.353 Consequently, the fair
use doctrine economizes on transaction costs by making such disclaimers
unnecessary.354
While the role of fair use in addressing high costs of exchange is
ground familiar to most copyright academics, the significance of fair use as
a remedy to strategic behavior is less familiar.355 Law and economics scholars are used to thinking about the implications of strategic behavior in divided ownership contexts such as oil field unitization or corporate
governance situations.356 The basic problem is that where several parties
possess a veto right that can block some profitable enterprise—a new stadium, oil well, or corporate merger—each has an incentive to ―hold out‖ for
a disproportionate share of the gains to be had from that enterprise. Both
351

Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
352
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (discussing parody as having
social value); SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (discussing
parody as entertainment and social and literary criticism).
353
Ty, Inc. v. Publ‘ns Int‘l, 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002).
354
Id. In this context, fair use could also be seen as the solution to a collective action problem because it allows publishers to credibly commit to not censoring reviews. Landes and Posner explain the
fair use status of book reviews in terms of implied consent, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 345, at 120–
22, but collective action and credible commitment are more convincing explanations.
355
See Sag, supra note 29, at 250 (criticizing doctrinal recommendations which aim to optimize
copyright scope in the abstract but do not account for the effect of uncertainty or strategic behavior).
356
See Zohar Goshen, Voting (Insincerely) in Corporate Law, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 815,
820 (2001) (explaining the holdout problem in the corporate governance setting); Gary D. Libecap &
James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United States, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 589 (2002); George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents, 57 REV. ECON. STUD. 351, 351 (1990) (citing examples such as ―oil
field unitization, . . . a group of workers deciding on whether to leave their firm and establish a new venture . . ., [and] the construction of a production facility generating pollution‖).
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experience and theory suggest that the mere presence of a divisible surplus
does not ensure that the parties will in fact agree on how that division
should proceed.357 Furthermore, agreements on division are constrained by
the costs of enforcement given that once a deal has been reached,
―[a]ccording to a strictly wealth-maximizing behavioral assumptions, a party to exchange will cheat, steal, or lie when the payoff to such activity exceeds the value of the alternative opportunities available to the party.‖358
The problems attending strategic behavior are particularly relevant to
copyright because all copyrighted works build on previous works to some
extent. Musicians attempting to clear samples can face license demands
from the original copyright owners that effectively seek to expropriate the
entire value of the newly created work.359 Strategic behavior may prevent
parties who would otherwise have much to gain from cooperating if multiple clearances are required, because it is quite rational for the players to
adopt strategies that risk destroying the surplus in order to gain a larger
share.360 Even nonstrategic parties sometimes cause holdout problems because of the divergent valuations that result from egotism and other cognitive biases.361 The fair use doctrine reduces transaction costs associated
with strategic behavior by eliminating the holdout power of the copyright
owner in situations where her contribution is comparatively small to that of
the defendant, or where some degree of copyright owner intransigence is effectively presumed.
The salient point is that the invocation of the property mantra does
very little to tell us whether the rights of a copyright owner include the right
not to allow copy-reliant technology to interact with her work.362 A further
important point remains: even if that issue is resolved in the copyright owner‘s favor, the form of that property right still remains an open question. It
is not enough to simply determine the appropriate ―property rules,‖ ―liabili-

357

See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23 (1982) (arguing that disagreements as to how to divide the contractual surplus may prevent successful Coasean bargaining); see also
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition From Marx to Markets,
111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (arguing that underuse results when too many owners hold rights of exclusion in a single resource).
358
NORTH, supra note 333, at 30.
359
See DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS: REVISED
AND UPDATED FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 306–08 (Simon & Schuster 2000) (1991); Ross, supra note 108,
at 282–83 (discussing the costs of licensing fees of nonparody sampling in rap and hip hop music as
prohibitively high for all but ―established artists and the media Goliaths‖).
360
Robert Cooter & Steven Marks with Robert N. Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 225, 243 (1982) (arguing that private bargaining to redistribute external costs will not achieve efficiency unless there is an institutional mechanism to
dictate the terms of the contract for dividing the stakes).
361
Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking
Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 89 (1994).
362
Oren Bracha makes a similar point in relation to Google Book. See Bracha, supra note 2.
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ty rules,‖ and ―inalienability rules.‖363 Even if we accept that the copyright
owners‘ rights are to be protected by a veto right (i.e., a property rule), the
question remains: under what conditions, if any, can this right be exercised?
As Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky observe in their own memorable phrasing, entitlements are often dynamic in nature and ―pliability‖
rules—contingent rules that provide an entitlement owner with either property rule or liability rule protection as long as some specified condition obtains—are quite common.364
The notion that the rights of the property owner can be protected under
permissive default rules coupled with an opt-out is hardly new. Robert Ellickson famously describes the ―fencing out‖ rule whereby cattle were allowed to roam freely on the property of others unless that property was
fenced.365 Landowners still maintained their property rights, subject to the
burden of fencing out neighbors‘ cattle. Presumably, if cattle could read, a
sign not unlike the Robots Exclusion Protocol would have been sufficient.
Cattle are just one example. Indeed, beneath the visage of ―property,‖ one
sees a variegated landscape with rules tailored according to the differences
between rights in Blackacre, animals (wild and domestic), oil and gas, water rights (subject to multiple regimes depending on geography and land
use), and air rights.366 Specifically in relation to copyright, the suggestion
that authors should be required to accept some cost before vindicating their
rights is not unprecedented. As Michael Mattioli perceptively notes, ―while
formal registration and deposit are no longer strict requirements for copyrightability, both are demanded of authors who wish to bring infringement
suits.‖367
Although copyright is primarily a system of property rights, it has no
uniform or immutable character. Just as the invocation of the property does
not settle disputes over the scope of rights, it is also inconclusive as to the
form of those rights. The centrality of transaction costs in modern property
theory and the practical importance of opt-out mechanisms in reducing
363

Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 341.
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002) (commenting on Calabresi and Melamed‘s methods).
365
See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
76 (1991). But note that here norms appeared to govern behavior regardless of the underlying law.
366
Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 IND. L.J. 803,
804–05 (2001). The Illinois Right of Publicity Act contains a special provision allowing professional
photographers to exhibit photos which might otherwise infringe upon a person‘s right of publicity ―unless the exhibition is continued by the professional photographer after written notice objecting to the exhibition has been given by the individual portrayed.‖ See Illinois Right of Publicity Act, 765 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 1075/35(b)(5) (2009).
367
Michael R. Mattioli, Opting Out: Procedural Fair Use, 12 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 20–21 (2007);
see also 17 U.S.C. § 411(b) (2006) (―[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United
States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim . . . .‖); id. § 412
(precluding statutory damages for infringements before the effective date of registration in many circumstances).
364
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transaction costs for copy-reliant technologies make some analysis of the
doctrinal implications of opt-out mechanisms essential. As in many other
cases, the fair use doctrine provides the most natural framework for that
analysis. The next section specifically addresses this question.
C. The Significance of Opt-Outs in Fair Use Analysis
1. The ―Purpose and Character‖ of Opt-Outs.—Assessing the relevance of an opt-out mechanism to the first statutory fair use factor—the
―purpose and character of the use‖368—requires some determination of what
types of uses should be preferred. The Copyright Act itself is not particularly instructive as to what uses should be preferred under this factor, thus
courts must inevitably revert to the fundamental principles of copyright law
itself.369
As discussed at length in Part II, one of these principles is that acts of
copying that do not communicate the author‘s original expression to the
public should generally not be held to constitute copyright infringement.
This follows from the essential observation that the purpose of copyright is
to protect authors from the unfairness of having their own original expression used in competition against them as a substitute for their work. Although the Supreme Court‘s most recent guidance stresses the question of
transformativeness,370 the transformative use doctrine is but one manifestation of the broader principle of expressive substitution.
In addition to this core concept of expressive substitution, courts
should also consider institutional design of copyright. Copyright achieves
its constitutional purpose—the promotion of progress in science and useful
arts—―[b]y establishing a marketable right to the use of one‘s expression‖;371 this marketability not only encourages authorship, it decouples authorship from the corrupting influences of state subsidy and elite
patronage.372 Copyright is not the only way to encourage authorship; a system of state prizes might do that just as well.373 The advantage of copyright
over other systems is that it not only encourages authorship, it also gives
authors a degree of autonomy. Accordingly, when evaluating a claim of
fair use, courts should consider to what extent the defendant‘s conduct as a
368

17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006).
Sag, supra note 4, at 385.
370
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); see also Leval, supra note
215, at 1111.
371
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)).
372
Netanel, supra note 231, at 288.
373
See, e.g., Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights,
44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001) (concluding that intellectual property rights do not possess a fundamental
social advantage over reward systems and that an optional reward system—under which innovators
choose between rewards and intellectual property rights—is superior to intellectual property rights).
369
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whole undermines or enhances the autonomy not just of the author in the
case, but of the class of authors the decision will affect. Put another way,
when in doubt, courts should attempt to maximize choice by setting default
rules that reduce transaction costs. In this context, the effect of opt-out mechanisms moves from the periphery of the fair use question to center stage.
Once judges appreciate that legal rules establish default positions
which are then subject to modification, the effect of opt-out mechanisms
becomes a significant consideration in fair use cases. A finding of fair use
conditioned on the existence of a low cost opt-out mechanism poses far less
risk to the autonomy of the author than a finding of fair use with no such
mechanism. Furthermore, such a finding may be the only way to overcome
certain information asymmetries and problems associated with strategic behavior.
Consider the following scenario. Assume that the majority of authors
would actually benefit from the defendant‘s proposed use, but that a minority objects. Assume further that the cost of affirmatively clearing rights for
the defendant is very high but the cost of taking advantage of the opt-out
mechanism provided by the defendant is very low.374 In this situation, if the
court determines that the defendant‘s use is fair, the majority‘s preferences
are satisfied and the minority must either tolerate the defendant‘s use or negotiate with the defendant to abate the use. This is not a common outcome
in copyright; in most situations, it is unreasonable to expect that copyright
owners would be able to contract around a default of permission given the
multiplicity of potential users they would have to deal with.375 If the court
determines that the defendant‘s use is fair subject to an opt-out, the majority‘s preferences are satisfied and the minority must either tolerate the defendant‘s use or incur the cost of the opt-out in order to have their
preferences satisfied. Under our assumption that the cost of the opt-out is
relatively low, the autonomy of the majority and the minority is preserved,
subject only to the cost of opting out. Finally, if the court determines that
the defendant‘s use is unfair, then the majority must bear the burden of opting in. The cost of opting in might be especially high. This could be because of coordination problems in situations where the use requires a
critical mass, or where copyright owners simply lack information about the
needs of potential users. If the cost of opting in is effectively preclusive, a
denial of fair use will bind the majority to the will of the minority. On the
other hand, if the cost of opting in is de minimis, both the majority and the
minority will have their preferences respected. From an economic perspective, the efficiency of an opt-in versus an opt-out system will depend on the

374
Note that the copyright owner‘s monitoring costs are a significant element of the cost of the optout; accordingly, for this scenario to be true, monitoring costs must also be very small.
375
The inability of the copyright owner to buy the silence of her critics is of course desirable in
many cases where the fair use in question takes the form of political or social commentary.
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ratio of those who prefer inclusion to those who do not, and on the comparative costs of opting in versus opting out.
Field v. Google illustrates the particular relevance of these criteria to
copy-reliant technologies.376 In the Field case, as in many copy-reliant
technology cases, taking advantage of the opt-out mechanism was virtually
costless. Indeed, the district court found that disabling the cache functionality for any of the pages on Field‘s website would have taken him ―a matter
of seconds.‖377 The legal significance of this finding tied directly to the
question of autonomy. In the court‘s view, given the easy availability of the
opt-out mechanism, it was in fact the plaintiff copyright owner—and not
Google—who effectively controlled whether cached links would appear in
relation to his web pages.378 Thus, by placing control in the hands of site
owners, the ―character and purpose‖ of Google‘s use of the copyrighted material was not unfair. Field also illustrates the evidentiary value of an established opt-out mechanism where the copyright owner claims that although
the use in question may appear to be nonexpressive, it nonetheless poses
some hypothetical danger of expressive substitution. As the Field court observed, ―[t]he fact that the owners of billions of Web pages choose to permit
these links to remain is further evidence that they do not view Google‘s
cache as a substitute for their own pages.‖379 In other words, the presumed
acquiescence of a large number of copyright owners who could very inexpensively opt-out indicates that expressive substitution is unlikely.
In sum, the relevance of the existence of a low cost opt-out mechanism
to the first fair use factor is that it affects the purpose and character of the
defendant‘s use in certain situations. Courts should consider whether (1)
the defendant‘s proposed use is one which the majority of affected copyright owners would actually favor; (2) the costs of taking advantage of the
opt-out are sufficiently small such that the autonomy of the minority is preserved; and (3) the costs of opting in would be high enough to threaten the
autonomy of the majority under an opt-in rule. Under these circumstances,
allowing the defendant to proceed subject to an opt-out will significantly
reduce transaction costs, thus benefiting the defendant and a majority of affected copyright owners while preserving the autonomy of the minority. In
choosing rules that facilitate private ordering through opt-outs, judges can
stay true to copyright‘s basic design by maintaining the autonomy of the author and allowing breathing space for later generations to make their own
contributions.
2. The Market Effect of Opt-Outs.—The presence of an opt-out mechanism is also potentially relevant under the fourth fair use factor, ―the ef376

Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
Id. at 1119.
378
Id.
379
Id. The court further remarked that ―Google‘s alleged copying and distribution of Field‘s Web
pages containing copyrighted works was transformative.‖ Id.
377
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fect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.‖380 The primary considerations here are similar to those stated above.
If the cost of taking advantage of an opt-out mechanism provided by the defendant is very low, then it is hard to see how a finding of fair use subject to
an opt-out could have a harmful effect on the ―potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.‖381 Indeed, it seems strange at first blush that any
copyright owner would bother to object to a permissive default coupled
with an opt-out rather than simply exercising the opt-out in this scenario.
There is, however, a logical explanation for such behavior. A rational
copyright owner will insist on a veto right rather than the right to opt-out
under either one of two conditions: (1) where the expected costs of obtaining and exercising a veto are lower than the expected costs of taking advantage of the equivalent opt-out; or (2) where the expected benefits of
exercising a veto are greater than those that can be obtained by merely opting out.
The first condition is easily illustrated. It would, for example, place an
intolerable burden on the average mystery writer if she had to affirmatively
tell each publisher in the United States that she did not wish them to publish
her manuscript.382 In that case, the expected costs of a veto over publication
are substantially lower than the costs of an alternative opt-out regime. In
the context of copy-reliant technology, however, the opposite may hold
true. For example, the average burden of the opt-out default policed by the
Robots Exclusion Protocol is extremely slight because the copyright owner
need only attach one notice to communicate to all comers.
The second condition in which a copyright owner would insist on a veto right rather than the right to opt-out is where the benefits of exercising a
veto are greater than those that can be obtained by merely opting out. This
condition can be met, as the Perfect 10 case illustrates, where the right to
opt-out is ineffective because the copyright owner has lost control of the
uses of her works by infringing third parties.383 Perfect 10 both benefits
from and is a victim of the open end-to-end architecture of the Internet.
The openness of the Internet gives Perfect 10 access to an enormous market
unconstrained by geography and zoning laws—the latter being especially
important to the ―adult‖ content market. However, the openness of the Internet also enables third parties to infringe Perfect 10‘s copyrights in ways
that can be hard to detect or enforce. By employing certain technical devices, Perfect 10 has opted out of inclusion in image-based search engines but
elected to remain visible to traditional text-oriented searches.384 In this way,
380
381
382
383
384
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Perfect 10 is a direct beneficiary of default rules and opt-out mechanisms
that prevail on the Internet vis-à-vis traditional search engines. Nonetheless, in a series of court battles, Perfect 10 has chosen to attack this same institutional setup in relation to image-based searching. The reason is simple:
for Perfect 10, opting out of image-based searching is ineffective because it
has not been able to prevent third parties from infringing its works. Perfect
10 thus illustrates the problem of a minority holdout to a transaction-costreducing mechanism. The decision for the court in this case was to determine how the benefits of the default of inclusion weighed against the costs
imposed on minorities such as Perfect 10. By suing Google rather than the
websites that illegally hosted its photos, Perfect 10 was effectively asking
the court to shift the costs of copyright enforcement onto Google and the
public at large, which benefits from image-based searching. Seen in this
light, the court‘s conclusion that the benefits of the open default outweighed
the limited costs to Perfect 10 is quite understandable.385
The second condition can also be met, as the Field case illustrates,
where the copyright owner believes that she can strategically use a veto
right to extract some of the surplus value in a joint enterprise contributed by
authors who consent to the use of their works or the independent investment
of the defendant.386 The trial court found that Field had no genuine objection to the default rules and opt-out mechanisms that prevail on the Internet.
Indeed, by his own admission, Field‘s objection was purely a strategic attempt to extract rents from Google.387 Field argued that Google‘s caching
functionality harmed the market for his works by depriving him of revenue
he could have obtained by charging Google for the right to present caches
of his web pages. The court rejected this transparently circular argument,
noting that ―the fourth fair use factor is not concerned with such syllogisms.‖388 As discussed in Part II, courts limit the potential circularity of the
fourth factor by limiting the market for potential derivative uses in a number of ways. The reason that the court excluded the copyright owner‘s
bootstrapping claim of a market effect in this case was that he was not seeking to extract the value that Google derived from access to his works—
385

See 487 F.3d at 725 (―Google has put Perfect 10‘s thumbnail images (along with millions of other thumbnail images) to a use fundamentally different than the use intended by Perfect 10. In doing so,
Google has provided a significant benefit to the public.‖).
386
See Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1118 (D. Nev. 2006).
387
Id. at 1113 (―Field decided to manufacture a claim for copyright infringement against Google in
the hopes of making money from Google‘s standard practice.‖). It should be noted that even if Google
had not prevailed on the issue of fair use, the result in this particular case would have been unchanged
because Field‘s invitation to Google‘s search robots amounted to an implied license.
388
Id. at 1121 n.9 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994)); see also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc‘n. Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1378 n.25 (N.D.
Cal. 1995) (―[T]here could hardly be a market for licensing the temporary copying of digital works onto
computer screens to allow browsing.‖); Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 806 (9th Cir.
2003) (noting that ―Mattel was unlikely to develop or license others to develop a product in the ‗adult‘
doll market‖).
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which was almost certainly nil. Instead, he was attempting to extract value
based on the permission costs he could impose on Google in relation to other copyright owners.
The Field case raises an issue of more general application: How should
courts treat strategic rent seekers in copyright disputes? In the ordinary
course, a copyright owner should be entitled to hold out for whatever she
thinks the use of her particular work is worth. That kind of rent seeking is
the mechanism through which copyright provides an incentive to creativity
in the first place. However, in the context of copy-reliant technologies at
least, courts should be disinclined to allow one copyright owner to expropriate the value added by other copyright owners. A copyright owner might
argue that the effect of one copyright owner‘s veto on other copyright owners is irrelevant to the fourth factor because the particular language of the
statute refers to ―the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.‖389 However, such a narrow reading of the fourth
factor is unsustainable in light of the purpose and structure of copyright
law.
To begin with, the very nature of common law adjudication demands
that courts consider the welfare of copyright owners beyond the plaintiff.
Litigated cases not only settle disputes between parties, they also set rules
and precedents that extend far beyond the specific parties to the litigation.
Courts should therefore consider the likely market effect of their decisions
on copyright owners generally, not merely on the particular plaintiff before
them;390 in doing so they are more likely to set beneficial precedents of general application. The Supreme Court‘s admonition in Campbell—to consider the four statutory factors in light of the purposes of copyright—also
requires courts to consider their decisions in light of their more general effect on the progress of science and useful arts.391
The second reason that courts should consider the welfare of copyright
owners beyond the plaintiff relates back to the role of autonomy in copyright law. As discussed, copyright achieves its constitutional purpose—the
promotion of progress in science and useful arts—by establishing a marketable right to an original expression.392 The author‘s marketable right in her
expression is not merely an instrument of incentive; it is also an instrument
of autonomy because it leaves the author free to choose her own path, one
that is significantly less reliant on state or elite subsidy. If the autonomy of
the author is a freestanding policy goal of the copyright system, then the effect of default rules on autonomy must be considered under the fourth factor. In a scenario where the majority of copyright owners would consent to
inclusion and the costs of individualized permission are much greater than
389
390
391
392
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the costs of opting out, the failure of a court to find fair use may effectively
bind the majority to the will of the minority. While this is by no means
preclusive of a finding against fair use, it is clearly a significant consideration under the fourth factor.
*

*

*

A combination of permissive defaults and opt-out mechanisms is a
common feature of copy-reliant technology. As this Article has shown, it is
often critical for copy-reliant technologies to mitigate otherwise prohibitive
transaction costs through opt-outs. Critics of particular copy-reliant technologies may argue that the use of opt-outs is irrelevant to the fair use analysis.393 This Article takes the contrary position. A dogmatic insistence that
literary property extends to every conceivable use of the author‘s work is
both inaccurate as a description of settled law and unhelpful in the context
of novel questions at the fringe of copyright law. The Copyright Act itself
requires courts to determine the content and form of the rights of authors in
response to new developments, and the fair use doctrine acts as an instrument of policy delegation in that regard. As this Part has shown, the central
role of transaction costs in defining the scope and content of property rights
and the specific statutory factors of the fair use doctrine each suggest that
the defendant‘s compliance with a low cost opt-out regime must be a significant factor in this analysis.
CONCLUSION
In many ways, technology is the dog on copyright‘s leash. In theory,
and occasionally in practice, copyright channels the direction of technological progress. But, more often, technology simply drags the law in its wake,
going where it will. This Article has demonstrated the pull of recent technological change on copyright law.
Copy-reliant technologies—
technologies that necessarily copy expressive works in large quantities, but
do so for nonexpressive purposes—are vital to the operation of the Internet.
And yet, because these technologies are so dependent on access to copyrighted works, they are also vulnerable to claims of copyright infringement.
An exploration of the common ground shared by search engines, electronic archives, plagiarism detection software, and other copy-reliant technologies sheds considerable light on the application of copyright law in the
Internet era. The mere fact that common ground exists does not suggest
that the copyright issues affecting these technologies must necessarily be
resolved uniformly. There are also significant differences between the
393
See, e.g., Steven Hetcher, The Half-Fairness of Google‘s Plan to Make the World‘s Collection of
Books Searchable, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 1, 67 (2006) (doubting the validity of the optout argument).

1681

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

copy-reliant technologies surveyed in this Article. In relation to the first
core question posed by copy-reliant technology—the potential for copyright
liability for the expressive use of copyrighted works—this Article has established that acts of copying which do not communicate the author‘s original expression to the public should not generally be held to constitute copycopyright infringement. In relation to traditional copyright subject matter at
least, to do so would conflict with decades of accumulated precedent that
limit the rights of copyright owners to those uses of their works that offer
some threat of expressive substitution.
In spite of its centrality, the question of nonexpressive use may not fully resolve all copyright disputes involving copy-reliant technologies. Inevitably, courts will face cases where the line between expressive and
nonexpressive use remains ambiguous. In many such cases, the effect of
opt-out mechanisms offered by the defendant moves from the periphery to
the center of legal analysis. Technologically enabled opt-out mechanisms
such as the Robots Exclusion Protocol help maintain order on the digital
frontier. Such devices can play an essential role in overcoming the otherwise daunting transaction costs facing copy-reliant technologies. Accordingly, to treat the phenomenon of copy-reliant technology
comprehensively requires addressing the significance of opt-out mechanisms under copyright law.
Copyright law is fluid by design, and nowhere is that fluidity more
evident than in the development of the fair use doctrine. The fair use doctrine both allows and requires judges to consider market realities in determining the application of copyright law in novel circumstances. To the
extent that other commentators have considered the doctrinal significance
of transaction costs in relation to isolated issues such as the Google Book
project, they have largely missed the point. Judges are not state planners;
they should not attempt to use the fair use doctrine to achieve some static
allocation of uses for a given set of copyrighted works. What judges should
do is apply the fair use doctrine to fashion a set of default rules: these default rules should encompass the distinction between expressive and nonexpressive uses articulated in this Article; they should also take into account
the role of transaction costs and facilitate the kind of private ordering that
copyright has traditionally embraced.
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